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Resilient Organisations Research Programme 
 
“Building more resilient organisations, able to survive and thrive in a world of 
uncertainty, through research and practice” 
 
We live in an increasingly complex world dealing with a broad spectrum of crises arising from both 
natural and man-made causes.  Resilient organisations are those that are able to survive and 
thrive in this world of uncertainty.  Resilience integrates the concepts of Risk, Crisis Management, 
Business Continuity Planning and Organisational Leadership to provide a platform for developing 
more robust and agile organisations.  
 
The Resilient Organisations Research Group (ResOrgs) is a multi-disciplinary team of 17 
researchers and practitioners that is New Zealand based and with global reach.  A collaboration 
between top New Zealand research Universities and key industry players, including the University 
of Canterbury and the University of Auckland, ResOrgs is funded by the NZ Foundation for 
Research, Science and Technology and supported by a diverse group of industry partners and 
advisors.  The research group represents a synthesis of engineering disciplines and business 
leadership aimed at transforming NZ organisations into those that both survive major events and 
thrive in the aftermath. 
Who we are: 
 
We are committed to making New Zealand organisations more resilient in the face of major 
hazards in the natural, built and economic environments.  Resilient organisations are able to 
rebound from disaster and find opportunity in times of distress. They are better employers, 
contribute to community resilience and foster a culture of self reliance and effective collaboration. 
 
The ResOrgs programme of public good research is aimed at effective capability building through 
research activities with significant impacts on policy and practice.  The group, in existence since 
2004, has hosted an international conference, industry and sector workshops, produced over 30 
conference and journal articles and 5 industry reports.  These research outputs are already 
influencing government policy and industry practice.  Our growing reputation has already resulted 
in many collaborations in Australia, the US, Canada and the UK, with a number of requests for the 
group to participate in a wide range of international projects.  
What we do: 
 
Activities and outputs of the group include informing and focusing debate in areas such as Civil 
Defence Emergency Management, post-disaster recovery, and the resilience of critical 
infrastructure sectors, in addition to core activities in relation to organisation resilience capability 
building and benchmarking.  We have produced practical frameworks and guides and helped 
organisations to develop and implement practical resilience strategies suitable to their 
environment. 
 
In an increasingly volatile and uncertain world, one of the greatest assets an organisation can 
have is the agility to survive unexpected crisis and to find opportunity to thrive in the face of 
potentially terminal events.  We believe such resilience makes the most of the human capital that 
characterises the modern organisation and offers one of the greatest prospects for differentiating 
the successful organisation on the world stage.  This resilience is typified by 20/20 situation 
awareness, effective vulnerability management, agile adaptive capacity and world class 
organisational culture and leadership.  More resilient organisations lead to more resilient 
communities and provide the honed human capital to address some of our most intractable 
societal challenges. 
Why we do it: 
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Executive Summary 
This report introduces the development and application of a method to analyse the 
decision making process of New Zealand’s State Highway Organisations (SHO) during 
extreme events. Building upon our previous research efforts (Dantas et al, 2007 and 
Ferreira et al, 2008), the aim is to obtain an unbiased and complete overview of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the current decision making. The report proposes 
procedures and metrics to analyse the quality of decision making, based upon the study 
of theoretical and practical concepts of decision making processes.  
 
The method used to analyse the quality of decision making was applied to 3 real events 
and 4 exercises, which have been observed since 2005. In addition to the real events, 
the exercises provide a realistic representation of the decision making processes likely to 
be implemented in the occurrence of extreme events and conditions. Above all, the 
research team’s assessment is that the exercises represented the most likely interaction 
between MCDEM / Regional Civil Defence / Lifeline groups and NZTA at national, 
regional and local levels.  
 
The results of the Quality of Decision Making (QDM) analysis indicate that SHO are 
capable, experienced and competent in dealing with major disruptions or crises that may 
affect the State Highway Network of New Zealand. SHO have achieved Good and Fair 
levels of resilience in terms of decision making activities during emergency response 
events and exercises. Depending on the event or exercise, this means that SHO can:  
- Be mostly or partially coordinated; 
- Be mostly or limitedly adaptable; 
- Be effective or partially effective in most circumstances; 
- Provide comprehensive or limited solutions delivery; and  
- Provide comprehensive or limited feedback to involved organisations. 
 
Our analysis revealed that SHO performed slightly better in real events than in simulation 
exercises. The differences in performance are mostly due to the fact that exercises have 
exposed more junior staff to situations which they do not yet fully understand and/or 
have the required experience to deploy and coordinate resources allocation.  
 
SHO’s major strengths were mostly observed in terms of their ability to perceive, assess 
and act based on outstanding experience and technical skills. These skills were most 
often derived from extensive networking (informal and professional) with key individuals 
involved in emergency response. Senior SHO staff demonstrated high levels of situation 
awareness and leadership in various situations.  
 
SHO’s major weaknesses in terms of decision making during an emergency response 
are mostly related to resource allocation and information sharing. Most decisions were 
made without clear and / or rationalised/ structured processes supporting them.  
 
Based on this report’s findings a series of recommended initiatives are listed. They 
comprise:  
• An extensive program to address the observed vulnerabilities;  
• A continuous program of event and exercise observation;  
• Creation of a decision making vulnerability matrix for use in exercise and event 
debriefs;  
• Training package for decision making simulations;  
• Standardisation of symbols for maps generated during emergencies;  
• A GIS-based information sharing framework; and  
• Use of GIS to support simulation exercises. 
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1 Introduction 
Extreme events present responding organisations with complex and unprecedented 
situations, and have the potential for catastrophic losses and consequences for 
communities. In crises and/or emergency events there is an immediate risk to life, health, 
property or environment (Vedder, 1990; Fink, 1986; Berroggi and Wallace, 1995). Thus, 
organisations have to quickly respond to observed and changing conditions. These are 
usually different to what personnel are used to dealing with on a daily basis, under 
business-as-usual situations (Fredholm, 1999).  
 
There is limited understanding of how organisations make decisions in extreme events. 
However a few studies have been observed in recent years which provide empirical 
evidence that decision makers are impaired by the complexities observed in real 
situations. (Zografos et al., 2000; Mendonça et al., 2001; Mendonça, 2005; Sinha, 2005; 
Mendonça et al., 2006; Mendonça and Wallace, 2007), It is also often observed through 
anecdotal evidence that decision makers use their own experience and common sense 
in order to respond to events. 
 
A particular and critical element of response to extreme events is the roading network. 
Recent worldwide events (e.g. Northridge Earthquake, 1994; Sumatra Earthquake and 
Tsunami, 2004) have demonstrated that the functionality of road transport networks to 
respond to emergencies is vital in saving lives and reducing economic impacts. Many 
organisations depend on road transport to conduct their own response activities (AELG, 
2005). Under the New Zealand Civil Defence Emergency Management Civil Defence 
Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002, road transport networks, along with other 
key lifeline utilities are expected to function to the fullest possible extent during and after 
an emergency event. 
 
This report introduces the development and application of a methodology to analyse the 
decision making process of New Zealand’s State Highway Organisations (SHO1
 
) during 
extreme emergency events. Building upon our previous research efforts (Dantas et al, 
2007 and Ferreira et al, 2008), the aim is to obtain an unbiased and complete overview 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the current decision making. This report also 
proposes procedures and metrics to analyse the quality of decision making, based upon 
the study of theoretical and practical concepts of decision making processes.  
This report is divided into six sections. The next section presents a conceptual 
framework to enable observation of decision making activities. The third section 
describes the method used to analyse decision making performance. The fourth section 
introduces the application of the observation framework and the Quality of Decision 
Making (QDM) analysis method to a series of case studies in which SHO are the main 
subject. The fifth section presents the analysis of SHO decision making processes.  
Finally, the sixth section presents the conclusions and recommendations which are 
drawn from the application of the analysis method and the whole experience of 
observing decision making processes in New Zealand. 
                                                 
1 SHO comprise New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) and its regional contractors and consultants. 
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2 Observation Framework 
 
This section presents an observation framework for the analysis of decision making 
quality for real or simulated events. Using the scheme proposed by the Defence 
Command and Control Research Program, (CCRP) model (Cheah et al., 2000) as the 
main reference, this framework focuses on three key elements: 1) situation awareness; 
2) good quality of information sharing; and 3) decision makers’ expertise and experience. 
Four interconnected domains of decision making are targeted; they include: 
 
• Physical domain is the tangible real world where physical and human resources 
are moved through time and space to attend the range of operations required to 
respond to the evolving extreme event. The physical domain is also the space 
where organisations and the physical and communications networks that connect 
all of the organisations involved in the management of the extreme events reside; 
 
• Information domainis the abstract space where information exists and is 
collected, created, processed, manipulated, and shared and from where 
information content and flow are created. The quality of the information depends 
on the accuracy, timeliness, and relevance of information from all sources. The 
information domain is the link between the reality of the physical domain and 
human perceptions, therefore it is formed by the intersection of the physical and 
cognitive domains;  
 
• Cognitive domainis identified within the mind of the decision-makers, where 
individual and organisational collective consciousness exists, where decision 
maker’s knowledge, capabilities, techniques, and procedures reside; and 
 
• Social domainis the domain where humans interact, exchange information, form 
shared awareness and understanding, and make collaborative decisions. This is 
also the domain where culture, values, attitudes, and beliefs are conveyed by 
leaders to society. The social domain overlaps with the information and cognitive 
domains, but it is distinct from both. Cognitive activities, by their nature, are 
individualistic; they occur in the minds of individuals. In contrast, shared 
awareness and shared sense-making (the process of going from shared 
awareness to shared understanding to collaborative decision making) are by 
definition, a socio-cognitive activity because the individual’s cognitive activities 
are directly impacted by the social nature of the exchange and vice versa. 
 
These domains are linked to decision making tasks and cognitive elements. The next 
sub-section presents the explanation of each of the decision making tasks and cognitive 
elements. This is followed by the description of the success indicators and vulnerabilities 
associated with each observation domain.  
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2.1 Decision making tasks and cognitive elements 
 
In order to evaluate the decision making process, it is important to identify the key 
elements under observation.  In this case, the elements under observation are the 
activities of roading organisations faced with extreme events or crises. Specific tasks and 
sub-tasks associated with the Physical and Information domains are listed in Table 2.1. 
In the same way, specific cognitive and sub-cognitive elements can be depicted for the 
Cognitive and Social domains. The observation framework proposed in Table 2.1 is not 
intended to be a rigid reference.  
 
Alternative and more suitable tasks and cognitive elements can be identified and 
specified depending on the event under observation. Importantly, the tasks and sub-
tasks, as well as the cognitive and sub-cognitive elements, are not likely to occur 
independently of the main tasks. It is acknowledged that functions of a decision making 
process are always accomplished concurrently and interactively.  
 
 
Table 2.1 -Tasks/sub-tasks to be observed, cognitive/sub-cognitive elements to be 
investigated during the decision making process 
Domains of DM Tasks Sub-tasks  Acronyms 
PHYSICAL  Response Actions 
Deployment of human resources DHR 
Deployment of physical resources DPR 
Temporary traffic management TTM 
Damage assessment and management DAM 
INFORMATION 
Data 
Processing 
Data collection Data C 
Data analysis, storing, summarising Data A 
Data sharing, disseminating Data S 
Data maintaining, updating Data U 
Communication 
Communication intra-organisations   C_INTRA 
Communication inter-organisations C_INTER 
Communication with media C_MEDIA 
Communication with public C_PUBLIC 
Domains of DM Cognitive Elements 
Sub-Cognitive elements  
COGNITIVE Situation Awareness 
Perception of the evolving scenario Perception 
Understanding of needs Understanding  
Projection of future Projection 
SOCIAL  
Collaboration 
and 
Coordination 
Collaboration intra-organisations   S_ INTRA 
Collaboration inter-organisations S_ INTER 
 
2.2 Success indicators and vulnerabilities 
Specific success indicatorsare identified for each of the decision making domains. They 
are: 
- Physical Domain (SP): optimisation of actions to ensure that the road network is 
able to function to the fullest possible extent, even though this may be at a reduced 
level, during the emergency and in the recovery and reconstruction phases. These 
include: 
   SP1) minimisation of road closures, duration and variability; 
   SP2) maximisation of accessibility to strategic services and places; and 
   SP3) minimisation of response and recovery costs  
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Theses success indicators can be assessed by quantifying post-emergency phase costs 
and the time required to complete the response and recovery phases to the 
emergency/crisis event, or by judging qualitatively the identification of priorities and 
resource allocation.  
 
- Information Domain (SI) measures the degree of connectivity achieved between 
the various decision makers in a network-enabled environment and the quality of the 
information exchanged. These include:  
   SI1) the degree of connectivity achieved;  
   SI2) the information richness; and  
   SI3) the extent of information reach.  
The degree of connectivity between the various decision makers can be assessed 
qualitatively by investigating the characteristics of the interactions between decision 
makers. Similarly, the information richness can be assessed qualitatively, as a 
function of the degree of sharing of various forms of information – visual, audio, 
multimedia, and tools (Albert and Hayes, 2003). Finally, the extent of information 
reach can be assessed along the dimensions of whether it facilitates simultaneous, 
selective, and universal communication. 
 
- Cognitive Domain (SC) focuses on a judgement of the decision-makers behaviour 
in order to understand the decision maker’s knowledge, capabilities, techniques, and 
procedures. These comprise: 
   SC1) the individual situation awareness;  
   SC2) the level of training and experience; and  
 SC3) intangibles of leadership and unit cohesion. 
Individual situation awareness can be investigated by using ad-hoc questionnaires or 
interviews targeting the assessment of the perception of evolving scenarios, the 
understanding of needs, demands and implications and the participants’ projection of 
the future. Codified techniques such as the Situation Awareness Global Assessment 
Technique, SAGAT (Endsley, 1995a and Endsley, 1995b) might also be adapted to 
suit the needs of the assessment. 
 
- Social Domain (SS) includes the responsiveness to the needs of emergency 
management agencies and the technical advice provided to leading emergency 
management agencies and lifeline groups. These include:  
  SS1)  responsiveness to the needs of emergency management agencies; 
SS2) technical advice to leading emergency management agencies and 
lifeline groups; and 
 SS3) coordination of actions with all involved agencies.  
The level of responsiveness and technical advice provided to emergency 
management agencies and lifelines groups can be assessed based on expert 
judgment after the observation phase. The coordination of actions with all involved 
agencies can be assessed by quantifying the level of self-synchronisation and team 
collaboration that is achieved. Self-synchronisation is the capability of junior staff to 
operate autonomously when appropriate. This involves re-tasking themselves 
through sharing awareness to achieve strategic and operational objectives in 
accordance with the high level decision maker’s intent. Self-synchronisation can be 
investigated by critically analysing the different types of communication exchanged 
between different levels of decision makers. In the context of roading organisations, 
self-synchronization is investigated by analysing whether or not contractors and 
consultants are able to work out the details of their response activities as new 
information about the external situation becomes available, without having to 
continuously rely on decision makers to provide specific directions. Team 
collaboration measures the degree and quality of collaboration between various team 
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members and can be inferred from the analysis of messages exchanged during the 
decision-making process. This focuses on information, action and coordination 
requests and transfers (frequency counts and the ratio of transfers to requests) and 
on the communication check.  
 
Tangible and intangible vulnerabilities affecting the fulfilment of the decision making 
success indicators are identified and recorded. For the sake of simple data processing 
and analysis, observed tangible and intangible vulnerabilities are annotated in a matrix. 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show examples of how physical and information vulnerability matrices 
would be populated for an event. As shown in Table 2.2, the example represents an 
event in which deployment of human resources (DHR), deployment of physical resources 
(DPR) and damage asset management (DAM) were observed. For each observed task 
and/or subtask, comments on observed tangible and intangible vulnerabilities are also 
recorded. For example, amongst all other vulnerabilities, it is noted that no standardised 
damage survey form was created for the DAM task (Table 2.3).  
 
Table 2.2 –Example of decision making vulnerability matrix for the Physical Domain.   
PHYSICAL DOMAIN 
SP1- Minimisation of road closures duration and variability 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities DHR DPR TTM DAM 
  - - Insufficient Resources  
-  - -  Lack of Situation Awareness about available resources 
- - -  No standardised damage survey form 
 
 
Table 2.3 –Example of decision making vulnerability matrix for the Information Domain. 
INFORMATIONDOMAIN 
SI1- Level of Connectivity 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC 
  - - - Poor degree of interactivity 
SI2- Information richness 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities 
  - - 
Technical problems limiting the 
information sharing in visual 
form via voice or multimedia 
transmissions  
- 
  - - 
Absence of supporting tools 
like Geographical Information 
System, or Decision Support 
System. 
- 
SI3- Information reach 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities 
  - - 
Unavailability of a dedicated 
terminal for each decision 
maker for accessing the 
information.  
Lack of simultaneity 
(decision makers unable to 
receive the content being 
shared at about the same 
time ) 
   - 
Instability of the adopted 
communication system, where 
various participants lose 
connectivity to the network at 
different times 
Lack of  selectivity 
(impossibility to selectively 
choose who to send out text 
messages to  
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
3 Quality of Decision-Making (QDM) Analysis Method 
 
The QDM method aims to evaluate roading organisations’ decision making processes 
during extreme emergency events. An excellent resilience level has been achieved if the 
following characteristics are observed: 
• timely
• 
 -  able to make rapid decisions in the face of severe consequences; able 
to act within windows of opportunity; 
robust
• 
 - effective across a variety of circumstances in order to allow for changes 
in situations; able to operate under highly stressful conditions without suffering 
degradation in performance and permitting recovery from missteps or adversity 
arising from a lack of full understanding; 
adaptive
• 
 - able to engage in a continuous process of strategy assessment and 
modulation, permitting changes in both processes and organisation as 
information is gained about the complex situation; able to cope with an 
ambiguous, rapidly changing and complex environment and able to provide more 
than one way to achieve success; 
effective
• 
 - able to deliver solutions that are as close to ideal as possible, despite 
the stress, time pressure, level of risks and complexity of the decision making 
situation; able to effectively judge and manage higher levels of risk by using 
knowledge and experience to conduct risk assessments; and 
learning
 
 - actively learns from feedback about the complex situation which result 
in observable changes of behaviour where required; able to react quickly and 
effectively, as decision makers learn what works and what does not and what is 
counterproductive, and able to change approaches as the complexity of the 
situation changes. 
QDM uses decision making assessment matrices as visual tools in which success 
indicators of different decision making domains are represented. The matrices are 
populated based upon processing qualitative or quantitative information previously 
recorded. 
 
The matrices are populated by considering the following items: 
• Applicability:  identify whether or not a success indicator is relevant to the 
specific decision making process under analysis; 
 
• Performance Level: report the suitability and quality achieved in performing the 
different sub-tasks. For each i-th sub-task/sub-cognitive element pertinent to a 
certain j-th success indicator within the analysed domain d,a performance levels  
Pi,j,d is assigned using a five-level qualitative scale: 
 
Poor (0< Pi,j,d ≤1); 
Limited (1< Pi,j,d ≤2); 
Fair (2< Pi,j,d ≤3);  
Good (3< Pi,j,d ≤4); and  
Excellent (4< Pi,j,d ≤5). 
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A zero score, corresponding to a Non Performed condition Pi,j,d=0 is also 
available. Table 3.1 shows the suggested qualitative scale for measuring the 
performance levels.  
 
• Degree of fulfilment: assess the performance level achieved for each success 
indicator, based on observed sub-tasks and sub-cognitive elements. 
Mathematically, the degree of fulfilment Fd j,is evaluated combining, according to 
a weighted average, the performance levelsPi,j,d attributed to the sub-
task/cognitive elements pertinent to the j-thsuccess indicator.  
 
∑
=
=
t
i
djiidj PF
1
,,α   (Eq. 3.1)  
where αi is a normalised weight associated to the i-thsub-task/cognitive element 
pertinent to a j-th success indicator;referred to as sub-task/cognitive elements 
normalised weight. The normalised weighted average allows accounting for the 
different proportional relevance that each sub-tasks/cognitive element could have 
in the fulfilment of a certain success indicators.  
 
• Decision domain global score: compute a global score representing the quality 
of the decision making process pertinent to the specific domain. The decision 
domain global scoreDd is computedcombining, according to a normalised 
weighted average, the degree of fulfilment Fj,d evaluated for the success 
indicators pertinent to the domain  Dd according to Equation 3.2.  
 
,
1=
= β∑ j d
r
d j
j
D F   (Eq. 3.2) 
where βj is a normalised weight associated to each success indicator j-thpertinent 
to the domain d and referred to as success indicator normalised weight.The 
normalised weighted average allows for the different proportional relevance that 
each success indicator could have in the quality achievement of a certain domain.  
 
Finally, a global score for the decision making quality is measured combining the 
scores evaluated for the 4 different domains, as follows:    
 
4
1=
= γ∑ d d
d
DM D   (Eq. 3.3) 
 
where γd is a normalised weight associated to each domain Dd and referred to as 
success indicator normalised weight. The normalised weighted average 
accounts for the different proportional relevance that each domain could have in 
the global quality of decision making process under different circumstances.  
 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide an example of Assessment Matrices populated for the 
analysis of the Physical and Information Domains in the decision making process. The 
expert judgment on the performance level achieved for the different sub-task/cognitive 
elements takes into account tangible and intangible vulnerabilities annotated in Tables 
2.2 and 2.3. For example, the “Minimisation of the road closures duration and variability” 
is identified as the only success indicator targeted during the decision making process in 
the Physical Domain Matrix. Toward the attainment of this goal, temporary traffic 
management (TTM) was performed at a “fair” level; the deployment of human resources 
(DHR) and the management of the damage assessment (DAM) were performed at a 
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“limited” level; while the deployment of physical resources (DPR) was performed at a 
“poor” level.  
 
The normalised weight, αi varies assuming a higher importance for the sub-taskDPR and 
DHR, αDPR =0.35 and αDHR =0.25 respectively, and lower importance for the sub-tasks 
TTM and DAM αTTM=αDAM=0.15.  
 
The values of the sub-task normalised weight, αi are supposed to be defined before the 
implementation of the QDM analysis through liaising with decision-makers. Sub-task 
weights accounts for issues that can influence the decision making processes such as 
pre-defined strategies and priorities, expectations from end-users and other responding 
organisations, resources availability, organisation’s role, etc. Multi-criteria analysis 
approaches can effectively support the process of priority and expectation identification 
and weighting (Ferreira et al., 2009).  
 
 
Table 3.1 - Assessment Matrix for the analysis of the Physical Domain in the decision 
making process.   
PHYSICAL DOMAIN 
A
pp
lic
ab
ili
ty
 
 
Performance Level  
 β 
D
eg
re
e 
of
 
Fu
lfi
lm
en
t 
SU
CC
ES
S 
IN
D
IC
AT
O
RS
 SP1) Minimisation of road closures 
duration and variability  2 1 3 2  1 1.6 
SP2) Maximisation accessibility to 
strategic services and places     - - - -  - - 
SP3) Minimisation response and 
recovery costs  - - - -  - - 
  DHR DPR TTM DAM   
 α 0.30 0.40 0.15 0.15   DP 
Applicable:  Yes , No   SUB-TASKS   1.6 
 
Level of 
Performance  5 Excellent 4 Good 3 Fair 2 Limited 1 Poor 
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Table 3.2 - Assessment Matrix for the analysis of the Information Domain in the decision 
making process.   
INFORMATION DOMAIN 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
 
Performance Level  
 β 
D
eg
re
e 
of
 
Fu
lfi
lm
en
t 
SU
CC
ES
S 
IN
D
IC
AT
O
RS
 
SI1) Connectivity  3 2 4 4  0.6 1.95 
SI2) Information 
richness  1 1 2 2  0.25 0.38 
SI3) Information reach  1 1 2 3  0.15 0.26 
   INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC   DI 
  α 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25    
Applicable:  Yes , No   SUB-TASKS   2.59 
 
Level of 
Performance  5 Excellent 4 Good 3 Fair 2 Limited 1 Poor 
 
 
Accounting for the different values, the Physical Domain results F1,1=2, according to 
Equation 3.1. Assuming that it was not possible to observe and judge theother two 
success indicators of the Physical Domain, their degree of fulfilment results in F2,1= 
F3,1=0. According to Equation 3.2, and setting necessarily β1=1, the performance of the 
Physical Domainhas been judged “limited”, with the Physical Domainglobal 
scoreresulting in, DP=1.6.  
 
The same evaluation is performed for the Information Domain Matrix. In this case the 
same proportion of relevance has been assumed for all the sub-tasks pertinent to the 
Information Domain, αi=0.25. Accounting for the performance levels attributed to the 
different sub-tasks, and implementing Equation 3.1, the success indicators of the 
Information Domain are targeted with a degree of fulfilment respectively corresponding to 
F1,2=3.25, F2,2=1.5, F3,2=1.75 for connectivity, information richness and information reach. 
It is worth noting that, differentproportion relevance for the three success indicators have 
been hypothesised as shown in Table 3.2 where the fulfilment of the information 
connectivity has been assigned a higher importance. According to Equation 3.2, the 
performance of the Information Domain within the decision making process, is judged as 
“fair” corresponding to DI=2.59.  
 
Table 3.3 summarises the results of the performance observed for all of the domains and 
provides the values assumed for decision making domain weights. The Physical and 
Information domains are supposed to be of the same proportional relevance, toward the 
attainment of a good quality decision making process, therefore γP=γI =0.5. Given the 
Social and Cognitive Domains were not observed, the sum in Equation 3.3 is computed 
considering only the results obtained for the Physical and Information Domains (d=1÷2 in 
Equation 3.3). The quality of the observed decision making reaches a “fair” level, globally 
resulting in DM=2.09.   
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Table 3.3 - Visual representation of the performance levels observed for the decision 
making domains. 
Physical DP DC Cognitive 
γP=0.5 1.6 - - 
γI=0.5 2.59 - - 
Information DI DS Social 
 
 
Using the decision domains (Dd) and global score (DM) obtained respectively through 
Equations 3.2 and 3.3, a roading organisation can assess, on one hand its performance 
relative to each single domain and, on the other hand, its performance relative to the 
overall decision making process.  
 
A five-level qualitative scale has been applied to categorise the performance of the 
decision making process in terms of:   
• Poor Resilience (0<DM≤1);  
• Limited Resilience (1<DM≤2) 
• Fair Resilience (2<DM≤3) 
• Good Resilience (3<DM≤4), and  
• Excellent Resilience (4<DM≤5).  
 
Table 3.4 shows the graphical output of the QDM analysis method. Attributes 
summarising the strengths and weaknesses affecting the single domain and the overall 
decision making processes of the organisation have been identified for each of the five 
levels identified (Table 3.4). According to the assumed scale, the decision making 
process of an organisation that achieves a global score DM=1.42 is classified as “Limited 
Resilience”, which means that the organisation is/has:significant dysfunction; very limited 
adaptability, not effective in many circumstances, very limited in solutions delivery; very 
limited feedback to involved organisations. 
- No feedback to involved organisations. 
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Table 3.4 - Visual representation of the performance levels observed for the decision making 
    Levels of Performance (Dd / DM scores)  
 
  
Poor 
Resilience (0-1) 
Limited 
Resilience (1-2) 
Fair 
Resilience (2-3) 
Good 
Resilience (3-4) 
Excellent 
Resilience(4-5) 
 
P 
 
 
- No optimisation 
consideration 
- Limited efforts to improve 
resources allocations 
- Significant efforts 
towards optimisation 
- Minimization of road closures 
- Maximization of accessibility 
- Minimization of costs 
- Dynamic minimization and  
maximization efforts 
  
-No connectivity 
amongst organisations 
- Casual connections with 
limited information 
exchange 
- Informal and formal 
connections  
- Limited coverage 
- No information sharing 
standards 
- Comprehensive connections 
- Extensive coverage 
- Information sharing standards 
adopted 
- Long-standing connections 
- Full coverage 
- Dynamic information sharing 
practice 
D 
O I  
M 
A   
I  
- No situation 
awareness 
- Limited individual 
awareness 
- Individual awareness 
- Limited training and 
experience  
- Individual awareness 
- High levels of training and 
experience 
- Limited leadership and cohesion 
- Individual awareness 
- High levels of training and 
experience 
- High levels of leadership and 
cohesion 
N 
S C 
 
  
  
- No responsiveness to 
others 
- Very limited 
responsiveness to 
emergency management 
( EM)agencies 
- Partial responsiveness to EM 
agencies 
- Limited technical advice 
provided 
- High level of responsiveness to 
EM agencies 
- Comprehensive technical advise 
- Limited coordination 
- Total responsiveness to EM 
agencies 
- Accurate and timely technical 
advise  
- Full coordination 
 S 
 
  
O  
- Dysfunctional; 
- No adaptability; 
- Not effective in most 
circumstances; 
- Severely limited in 
solutions delivery; 
- No feedback to 
involved organisations 
- Significantly 
dysfunctional;  
- Very limited adaptability 
- Not effective in many 
circumstances 
- Very limited in solutions 
delivery; 
- Very limited feedback to 
involved organisations 
- Adequate but with some 
dysfunctionality;  
- Limited adaptability 
- Not effective in all 
circumstances 
- Limited in solutions delivery; 
- Some feedback to involved 
organisations  
- Mostly  coordinated 
- Mostly adaptable 
- Effective in most circumstances 
- Comprehensive solutions 
delivery; 
- Comprehensive feedback to 
involved organisations 
- Timely 
- Adaptive 
- Robust 
- Adaptive 
- Effective 
- Learning-oriented 
V   
E   
R   
A   
L
L   
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4 Case Studies 
 
The QDM analysis method proposed in section 3 is used to study how SHOs (New 
Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA2
 
), its consultants and contractors) set priorities and 
make decisions during response and recovery to extreme emergency events. Both real 
events and emergency management exercises involving SHOs in New Zealand have 
been observed and assessed since 2004. 
The observation of events and exercises follows a three-step process, as shown in Table 
4.1.  
 
1. Step 1 comprises knowledge elicitation, including the observation of the decision 
making process and the development of descriptive accounts of the 
events/exercises.  
 
2. Step 2 entails debriefs including in-depth interviews with subject matter experts. 
This aims to identify the cognitive elements that underlie goal generation, 
decision making and judgements. Debrief and interview activities focus on 
gaining information to analyse situation assessment strategies, identification and 
interpretation of critical cues, patterns and meta-cognitive strategies.  
 
3. Step 3 includes the analysis and process of acquired data/information in order to 
implement the QDM analysis method.  
 
 
Table 4.1 - Activities and expected outcomes for the three-step method proposed for the 
analysis of extreme events decision making. 
Step Activities Expected Outcomes 
1  
Knowledge 
Elicitation 
 
Observation of decision making 
process during real and simulated 
extreme events and tracing of the 
decision making stories  
Comprehensive understanding of the real 
or simulated event scenario and 
qualitative assessment of 
tangible/intangible vulnerabilities 
affecting the decision making  
2 
Debriefs and in-depth interviews 
with subject matter experts following 
real and simulated events 
Identification of the cognitive elements 
and underlying decision making  
3 
Analysis and 
Knowledge 
Representation 
Extracting meanings from the 
acquired data and information and 
displaying the results 
Assessment of strengths and weaknesses 
underlying the decision making process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 NZTA refers to the amalgamation of Land Transport New Zealand and Transit New Zealand, which 
occurred in 2008. 
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Characteristics of observed real events and simulation exercises   
This section summarisesthe characteristics of four simulation exercises (Table 4.2) and 
three real events (Table 4.3) involving SHOsobserved since 2004. 
 
The occurrence of a major earthquake was the most common scenario adopted during 
exercises. Only one exercise considered the occurrence of a tropical cyclone (Marconi 
Exercise) and another presented the occurrence of a major volcano eruption in the 
Auckland area. The observed sample has mainly included two types of exercise 
(tabletop and functional) and a significant variety of levels of organisational involvement 
(international, national, regional and single organisation). Only one observed exercise 
was classified as a table-top exercise (Marconi Exercise organised by the Auckland 
Lifelines Group) while all the others have been identified as functional exercises.  
 
Due to resource limitations, it was only possible to directly observe the consultants and 
contractors actions and decision making procedures in the Icarus exercise. For all other 
exercises, only the activities of NZTA were observed. From our analysis, we conclude 
that consistently satisfactory decision making was observed during the exercises. Our 
research team's assessment is that these exercises, although necessarily a simplification 
of the conditions of a real extreme event, provide a good indication of the likely 
interactions between MCDEM./ Regional Civil Defence / Lifeline groups and NZTA at 
national, regional and local levels.  
 
 
Table 4.2 - Characteristics of observed simulation exercises. 
Name Date 
Location Simulated Event Exercise Typology  Aim 
Observed 
Organisations 
Capital Quake  
14th and 15th 
November 2006, 
Wellington  
major earthquake 
in Wellington 
national civil defence 
functional exercise 
organised by the 
MCDEM 
test New Zealand's all-of-
nation arrangements for 
responding to a major 
disaster 
NZTA Regional 
Office, 
Wellington 
Marconi Exercise  
8th June 2007 
Auckland  
 tropical cyclone 
causing significant 
damage and 
flooding in the 
Auckland Region 
distributed tabletop 
exercise 
organised by the 
Auckland Engineering 
Lifelines Group  
lifeline utility co-
ordination processes in the 
Group EOCwith focus to 
information transfer 
NZTA 
Northcote Traffic 
Management 
Centre (ATTOMS 
Centre) Auckland 
Icarus Exercise  
22nd November 
2007 
Wellington 
 
 
 
major earthquake 
in Wellington 
 
 
 
Functional exercise as 
part of the NZTA 
scheduled annual training  
train staff in their roles 
within EOC (Emergency 
Operations Centre); 
practice allocation and 
communication between 
organisations; test aerial 
reconnaissance 
arrangements between 
NZTA and Greater 
Wellington Regional 
Council  (GWRC) 
NZTA Wellington 
Regional Office, 
Consultants one 
contractor and the 
GWRC  
Ruamouko 
Exercise  
13th March 2008 
Auckland  
 volcano eruption 
in  Auckland 
Tier 4 national-level 
functional exercise in 
accordance with the 
MCDEM National 
Exercise Programme 
(joint local government 
and central government 
exercise, 
Auckland CDEM Group, 
MCDEM, DPMC) 
test New Zealand's all-of-
nation arrangements for 
responding to a major 
disaster with particular 
focus on roles and 
responsibilities,  
arrangements and  
connections between, 
local, regional, national 
and international agencies 
NZTA National 
Office in 
Wellington, 
GEOC Auckland, 
GEOC 
Wellington,  
ATTOMS Centre, 
Waitakere EOC 
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Table 4.3 - Characteristics of observed real events. 
Name Date 
Location Summary Event Description Organisations Observed 
Ruapehu 
Volcanic 
Eruption 
25th of 
September 
2007 
A 2.9 Earthquake occurred on the night of the 25th 
September that triggered a number of response actions 
from NZ Police and a local contractor. The response 
included the evacuation of sixty people from Aorangi and 
Ruapehu huts, closing ski fields on the 26th September and 
assessing damage at State Highways surrounding the 
Tongariro National Park on the night of the event. Road 
damage was not reported and an injured climber was the 
only direct victim of the event. 
Downer Edi Works 
Infrastructure 3
 
(observation 
on site) 
Storm Events 
2008 
31st of July 
2008 
During late July 2008, a severe weather front arrived in 
New Zealand. Both north and south islands were affected 
by heavy rain, which created flooding and landslides. From 
the 28-30th July, four researchers monitored the event’s 
development. On site observation at the consultant’s office 
took place on the 31st July when the storms badly affected 
the South Island’s state highway network. Major damage 
observed included flooding in both north and south of 
Christchurch and a major landslide south of  the Kaikoura 
Peninsula on SH1. 
Opus International 
Consultants 4
Matata Flood 
(Christchurch 
office) 
16th  -30th May 
2005 
The flooding was a small-medium sized emergency. The 
event was localized, mostly in the Matata township and its 
nearby coastal area, which comprises the SH 2 Straight 
(approximately 5 km of road). As the emergency response 
was concentrated in very specific parts of the roading 
infrastructure, it involved organisations and their resources 
which were coordinated locally by the NZTA area engineer 
and Consultant.   
NZTA engineer, 
Consultant and Contractor  
(observation on site) 
 
The following subsections present the description and analysis of all observed exercises 
and events. For the sake of ease of understanding, throughout the report the domains 
under analysis were identified with initial capital letters, rather than in numerical terms for 
all the acronyms (e.g. the first success indicators for the physical domain were identified 
with FS1 rather than with F21). 
 
 
4.1 Marconi Exercise 
 
The following subsections present the description of the exercise activities and the 
analysis of the Marconi Exercise. 
 
4.1.1 Background and activities 
On the morning of Friday 8th June 2007, the Auckland Region exercised coordination 
and communication between lifeline utilities and Civil Defence Emergency Management 
(CDEM) centres. The exercise focused on the response phase of a major emergency, 
                                                 
3 Hereafter refereed as Works. 
4 Hereafter refereed as Opus. 
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simulated via a distributed tabletop exercise. The exercise was led by the Auckland 
Engineering Lifelines Group (AELG) representing Auckland transport, water, energy and 
telecommunication utilities in conjunction with the Auckland CDEM Group. 
 
The Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs) at Auckland, North Shore, Waitakere and 
Manukau cities, the CDEM Group EOC team and the Lifeline Utility Coordinators took 
part in the exercise together with 24 lifeline utility organisations across all sectors. The 
transportation sector was represented by NZTA, On Track (the regional railways 
corporation), Air New Zealand and Auckland International Airport. 
 
The aim of the exercise was to review and improve the lifeline utility coordination 
response processes. Specific objectives were: 
i) to review lifeline utility co-ordination processes in the Group EOC 
through escalating levels of emergency (culminating in a Group 
Declaration of a Civil Defence Emergency); 
ii) to assess the lifeline utility interface with the Group EOC with a focus on 
communication; and 
iii) information transfer.  
 
Beyond these objectives, lifelines utilities were free to test their own plans, processes 
and procedures during the exercise. 
 
Scenario 
The scenario was an extreme weather event (tropical cyclone) causing significant 
damage and flooding in the Auckland Region. For the transport sector the damage 
scenario involved: a) high wind gusts (up to 170km/h); b) heavy rainfall; c) heavy sea 
swells and inundation; d) major flooding on the State Highways and on the main arterial 
routes. It also included a widespread and prolonged power outage with uncertain times 
for service restoration, possible shortage of fuels and telecommunications related 
impacts.  
 
The seriousness of the scenario induced other effects such as main road closures, 
including the harbour bridge, traffic signal failures and subsequent gridlock, an increase 
of traffic accidents, inability of emergency services to reach relevant accident sites or 
hospitals, the need to evacuate people, and the need for telecommunications and 
electricity sector organisations to use transport routes to repair and maintain their 
infrastructures.  
 
Roading utilities were assessed for their responsibilities such as liaison with the Police to 
control the roads; the use of contractors to assist with traffic control; restoration of priority 
routes, assisting Councils to manage evacuations, emergency services requirements, 
and arranging for aerial photography depending on the extent of damage.  
 
Emergency Management Procedures Relevant for Marconi Exercise 
Lifeline Utility Response & Recovery Protocols (AELG 2006) outlined recommendations 
for communication and information transfer between the lifeline utilities and the 
Emergency Operations CentreGroup (referred in the following as Group EOC). Figure 
4.1 shows the expected relationship between lifeline utilities and the Group EOC 
according to the protocol for local emergencies (Figure 4.1a) and regional emergencies 
(Figure 4.1b). Utilities are expected to communicate directly with each localEmergency 
Operations CentreEOC (referred in the following as Local EOC) in the event of local 
emergency (Figure 4.1a).  
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In the event of a regional scale emergency, coordination of the lifeline utilities will occur 
at a regional level via a Lifeline Utility Coordinator, part of the Group EOC (Figure 4.1b). 
This was demonstrated during the Marconi Exercise when Local Authorities continued to 
report locally with relevant local EOCs (Figure 4.1b). The CDEM Group Public 
Information Management controls media and public communication during regional 
events. NZTA makes use of its “NZTA Emergency Procedures Manual: Region 2” (TNZ 
2000) and the results of the Auckland Engineering Lifeline Group Project 5 (AELG 2004, 
AELG 2005), which identify priority routes for response and recovery activities in the 
Auckland region. 
 
Activities at NZTA 
NZTA used the emergency management room in the Northcote Traffic Management 
Centre (ATTOMS Centre). The Centre is also used to monitor traffic 24 hours and 7 days 
a week in the Auckland Metropolitan area. Three participants from NZTA took part in the 
exercise plus the manager of the ATTOMS centre.  
 
The exercise had a “warm start” in which it was assumed that the initial notifications and 
activation of EOCs had already been carried out after the issuing of a MetService 
weather forecast. This meant that staff were on standby and the EOC group was already 
activated. Exercise injects were sent via e-mail and as Word Documentattached files 
from the Lifelines Utility Coordinator to all the lifelines utilities taking part in the exercise. 
The injects comprised weather warnings and updates on the development or progress of 
the scenario. Three types of injects were received before the formal start of the exercise: 
1) the weather warnings; 2) radio station news; and 3) the Auckland Group EOC Initial 
General Situation Report.  
 
After the “warm start”, NZTA focused on impact assessment/communication and 
identification of pending issues and reporting back needs/ implications. The following 
sub-sections describe the outcomes of these activities. 
 
 
NZTA Impact assessment and communication 
As NZTA road maintenance contractors did not participate in the exercise, the impact 
assessment was made exclusively on the basis of injects that were received from the 
Lifelines Utility Coordinators. In order to facilitate discussions about possible 
consequences to network operations and possible actions to be undertaken, key 
information was summarised on a white board (Figure 4.2b). The damage and disruption 
highlighted in the first three injects were summarised by NZTA staff on a laminated map, 
using blue colours, while the possible actions to be undertaken were highlighted with red 
colours (Figure 4.2a).  
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(a) (b) 
Figure 4.1 - Communication and information transfer between Lifeline Utilities and EOCs or Group EOC after the Utility Response & 
Recovery Protocols (AELG 2006): a) Local Emergency, b) Regional Emergency.  
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(a) (b) 
Figure 4.2 - Information from the event warning on: a) the Auckland Region laminated map; b) white board. 
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Subsequently NZTA, together with other lifelines utilities, were requested to state their 
current situation and report to the Lifeline Utility Coordinator. NZTA personnel produced 
a report comprising:  
1) Overview of the scale and extent of event and the impact on the networks;  
2) Major disruptions experienced including location and number of customers 
affected in each location and estimated restoration times;  
3) Priority areas of response and actions;  
4) Public information and precautions to be promulgated;  
5) Requests for support or specific information;  
6) Any other critical pending issues; and  
7) Action required by Group EOC. 
 
Identification of pending issues arising from the scenario and reporting back 
needs and implications 
Following an external request from the Lifeline Utility Coordinator, NZTA had to analyse 
interdependencies among lifelines utilities, considering a detailed report from the 
electricity sector. This intended to encourage organisations to analyse pending issues 
arising from an electricity shortage. Furthermore, each lifeline utility sent a report to all 
other participants to share information. NZTA did not take action to summarise the 
information received from the other lifelines utilities.  
 
Regarding the electricity sector report, the lifelines utilities were required to deal with 
three other important issues, namely:  
1) test of alternative communications;  
2) identification of the services dependent on fuel and fuel stocks assured for the 
next 3-5 days (contacting the fuel supplier directly to ascertain this, if necessary);  
3) use of the priority sites lists and maps provided in AELG (2005) as priorities for 
restoration.  
 
Regarding the test of alternative communication, contacts via radio were attempted with 
the NZTA regional office in Auckland and with one contractor (Figure 4.3a). The initial 
attempt was unsuccessful. Communications via fax were also tested. The main road 
closures resulting after the damage scenario were sketched on a map showing that the 
highway network in the Auckland region (Figure 4.3b). 
 
Fuel issues were discussed and NZTA stated that “contractors will need diesel on 10th 
June”. The fuel stocks assured for the next 3-5 days were identified on the map (Figure 
4.5), but fuel suppliers were not contacted in order to confirm that information.  
 
Finally, priority sites lists and maps were assumed to be the same previously identified 
by Auckland Lifeline Organisations Group (AELG 2004, AELG 2005). Figure 4.4 shows 
the map with priority routes for Auckland City that was displayed in the emergency 
management room (Figure 4.4a). Some relevant particulars from the same map are 
shown in Figure 4.4b and 4.4c (Auckland city centre and legend, respectively). NZTA 
reported back to the Lifeline Utility Coordinator after discussing the previous mentioned 
issues and by modifying and updating the first version of the report. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 4.3 - Pending issues arising from the scenario: a) test of alternative communications; b) collocation of fuel stocks on the map. 
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(b) 
 
(a) (c) 
Figure 4.4 - Auckland Lifelines Project 2006 (AELG 2006): a) Map of priority routes and location of strategic services; b) priority routes in 
Auckland city-centre; c) legend of the map.  
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4.1.2 QDM analysis 
Given that the exercise’s primary objective was “to review and improve the lifeline utility 
coordination response processes”, involved organisations were not assessed on their 
own response processes. Attention was given to how their decisions were exchanged 
amongst lifelines and how “clear” they were. NZTA used the exercise in order to check 
information flow and communication protocols with other lifelines utilities. NZTA 
personnel undertook decision making discussions mostly about “how to communicate” 
during the event. Efforts were not observed to test NZTA’s plans and procedures for 
implementing actions, nor did they specifically address the interdependencies or 
relationships with other lifeline organisations.Therefore, the analysis of the decision 
making process, QDM analysis, has been limited to the examination of the Information 
Domain (refer to section 2 for a comprehensive theoretical description).  
 
Analysis of the Information Domain during Marconi Exercise 
During the exercise, the NZTA team was interested in the best way of communicating 
and alternative ways of communicating in the event of a power shortage. Questions were 
raised about power availability and consequences on communication (internet, radios, 
mobile phones, etc.), possible internet/e-mail overload and the operability of web-
cameras (CCVT cameras) and Variable Message Signs (VMS).  Issues observed during 
the exercise are qualitatively described in the vulnerability matrix shown in table 4.4.The 
results of the QDM analysis for the information domain are summarised and represented 
in Table 4.5. It is worth noting that the data processing observed during Marconi 
Exercise was analysed as part of the Information Domain. All the sub-tasks related to the 
data processing were jointly analysed and summarised under a unique acronym, namely 
DATA, both in the Vulnerability (Table 4.4) and in the Assessment Matrix (Table 4.5). 
 
Communication with the public and the media was identified as a high level of 
importance. The NZTA team were aware of, and discussed, the necessity of coordinating 
media releases (“…we have to be careful about the conflict information with media 
information…”) and of coordinating communication at both local and regional levels. 
Overall, communications with the media and the public were performed at a high level of 
commitment and accuracy, although there was a reluctance to release information. By 
the end of the exercise the NZTA team was successful in achieving a “good” level of 
information connectivity at the intra-organisational level and with the public.  At the intra-
organisational level the information richness was judged as “limited”, since the 
information sharing was limited to a verbal discussion. The information reach was 
affected by a few tangible vulnerabilities and was judged as“poor” (Table 4.4).  
 
Regarding the communication with the media/public, a “fair” level of information richness 
was achieved using multiple forms of tools to share information (e.g. media release and 
dedicated websites), while information reach was affected by a few vulnerabilities (Tale 
4.4) and was performed at a “limited” level. 
 
 
 
 27 
 
 
 
The inter-organisational communications (communication with other lifelines utilities) was 
performed according to the Lifeline Utility Response and Recovery Protocols that 
required liaising with the Lifeline Utility Coordinator. However, the NZTA team did not rely 
on the coordination of communication by the Lifeline Utility Coordinator. The NZTA team 
expressed a wish to have someone from NZTA representing them at the Group EOC. 
The level of connectivity reached in the inter-organisational communications has been 
judged as “poor”. 
 
The information richness at the Group EOC (inter-organisational level) was judged as 
“fair”, because both multimedia and audio tools were used to share information. The 
information reach provided regular, simultaneous and selective communication, but it 
was also affected by different vulnerabilities (Table 4.4), therefore it was judged “limited”. 
It is worth remebering that, the intra-organisation communication was limited to the level 
of verbal discussions amongst NZTA personnel, because consultants and contractors 
were not involved in the exercise.  
 
 
Overall analysis 
The degree of fulfilment of the success indicators pertinent to the Information Domain 
resulted in FI1=3, FI2=2.25, FI3=1.75, respectively for Connectivity (SI1) Information 
Richness (SI2)and Information Reach (SI3). Assuming the same proportion relevance 
βi=0.33 for all of the success indicators and applying Equation 3.2, the performance of 
the Information Domain within the decision making process is judged as “fair” 
corresponding to (DI=2.33).  
 
Considering that the Information Domain was the only one observed during Marconi 
Exercise, the global score for the decision making process results DM=DI=2.33. 
According to the assumed qualitative scale (Table 4.3), DM=2.3 means that the 
organisation’s performance result is “Fair Resilience” (adequate but some areas of 
dysfunction with limited adaptability; not effective in all circumstances; limited in solutions 
delivery; some feedback to involved organisations).  
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Table 4–4 - Information Domain Vulnerability Matrix after Marconi Exercise. 
INFORMATIONDOMAIN 
SI2- Information richness 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC DATA Tangible Vulnerabilities 
Intangible 
Vulnerabilities 
- - -  Use of non-codified abbreviations and symbols - 
- - -  
Use of the same situation report for the 
whole exercise, difficulties in identifying 
changes in the situation 
- 
SI3- Information reach 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC DATA Tangible Vulnerabilities 
Intangible 
Vulnerabilities 
-   - 
Potential difficulties of accessing the 
information released due to power outage  - 
- -  - 
Lack of TV and radio in the emergency 
room. Lack of awareness of the information 
that media were realising to the public 
- 
-  - - 
Lack of a dedicated terminal for each one of 
the decision makers for accessing 
information  
- 
-  - - Communication was not always timely  - 
 - - - 
Communication not always far-reaching, 
some of the contractors were not receiving 
NZTA email 
- 
 - - - Radio connection with consultants was not always working - 
- - -  
Information summary and report on the 
laminated map and board was insufficient 
and too inaccurate to allow for a clear 
representation of the evolving scenario 
- 
 
Table 4–5 - Information Domain Assessment Matrix after Marconi Exercise. 
INFORMATION DOMAIN 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
 
Performance Level  
 
D
eg
re
e 
of
 
Fu
lfi
lm
en
t 
/S
U
CC
ES
S 
IN
D
IC
AT
O
RS
 
 SI1)Connectivity  4 1 4 N/A  3 
SI2) Information richness  2 3 3 1  2.25 
 SI3) Information reach  1 2 2 2  1.75 
   INTRA INTER MEDIA/ PUBLIC DATA  DI 
Applicable:  Yes , No   SUB-TASKS  2.33 
Level of 
Performance  5 Excellent 4 Good 3 Fair 2 Limited 1 Poor 
 29 
 
4.2 Icarus Exercise 
 
The following subsections present a description of the exercise activities and analysis of 
the Icarus Exercise. 
 
4.2.1 Background and activities 
On the morning of 22nd November 2007, the NZTA Wellington Regional Office, in 
conjunction with its consultants and contractors, exercised its emergency response 
arrangements. The exercise was part of the scheduled annual training organised by the 
NZTA Wellington Regional Office and involved two consultancy companies (MWH and 
OPUS), one contractor (Fulton Hogan) and the Greater Wellington Regional Council 
(GWRC). 
 
One of the aims of the exercise was to train staff in their respective roles. The exercise 
was also used to test the practicality of the aerial reconnaissance arrangements that 
have been developed through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between NZTA 
and Greater Wellington Regional Council. 
 
This report presents in detail, the observation conducted at the Fulton Hogan Emergency 
Operations Centre (EOC). Furthermore, observations of the NZTA and Lifeline 
Coordinator responses are discussed. Finally, findings and conclusions are presented 
regarding decision making and communication issues identified after experiencing the 
Exercise Icarus.  
 
Scenario 
The scenario was based on the Capital Quake Exercise in 2006, which comprised a 
major rupture in Wellington’s fault, (see Appendix A for scenario’s details). The NZTA 
made a few modifications to the scenario to meet the specific objectives of the exercise. 
These modifications focused on preparedness and decision making related to reopening 
State Highway (SH) 1 north of Wellington (Exercise Icarus Planning Document, 2007). 
The specific exercise objectives were: 
• Practice EOC operations and role delegation; 
• interpret reconnaissance information acquired by FH field staff and aerial 
photographs; and 
• train and practice interactions between organisations and the Lifeline 
Utility Coordinator. 
 
A research team member took part as an observer at Fulton Hogan’s EOC. The aim was 
to observe how decision making and communication is performed in a real event 
simulation.  
 
The exercise ran from 9.00 am to 12.30 pm and included the various small events as 
shown in Figure 4.5. A description of each small event is listed below: 
1. Bridge over motorway at Johnsonville – holes in the road on both sides of the 
bridge – soil collapsing; 
2. Rail bridge over motorway at bottom of Ngauranga Gorge – smoke coming out of 
tunnels, East (South) bound lanes blocked; 
3. Aotea Quay bridge onto Hutt Road – span fallen down with obvious displacement 
of bridge both ways; 
4. Motorway over rail yards – one span on catchers and displacement to both north 
and south bound lanes; 
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5. Motorway off-ramp by James Cook hotel blocked with debris by a fallen building; 
6. North end of Terrace Tunnel – slips cover north bound lane; 
7. Portal at eastern end of Mt Vic Tunnel - blocked by a landslide; 
8. Southbound section of road between Pukerua Bay and Plimmerton - slips; and 
9. Between Pukerua Bay and Fisherman's Table – massive slips/blockages (and a 
passenger train half visible within one of the slips). 
 
Even though the exercise’s primary goal was the reopening of SH 1, conflicting 
information about SH58 was given in order to create a more complex decision making 
problem for participants. Furthermore, it was expected that organisations could improvise 
and create injects in order to test their own procedures and to train their respective 
emergency response teams. 
 
Damage and information about the road network was provided to participants through a 
series of injects. Annex A-1 presents the scenario scene setter and the timetable details 
for the respective injects. These include extra injects, which were used depending on the 
organisations’ response actions. 
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Figure 4.5 - Snapshot of Damage in the Road Network. 
(Source: Aerial photograph from Land Information New Zealand, 2007)  
Note: Damage 1, 8 and 9 are located outside of the aerial photograph above. 
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Activities at the Fulton Hogan Emergency Operations Centre 
The exercise was observed at Fulton Hogan Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) which 
was set up at the Fulton Hogan Wellington area office (Marine Parade, Petone). The 
exercise observation can be divided into three different phases: 1) Pre Exercise, 2) 
Exercise Observation and 3) Post Exercise. The description of each phase is presented 
below: 
1) Pre Exercise:
 
 The room was initially arranged to reflect possible effects from 
an Earthquake (Figure 4.6). This was followed by a quick introduction presenting 
the scenario, exercise rules, objectives, etc. Fulton Hogan’s manager clarified his 
role during the exercise and the expectations of FH’s team in terms of response 
and emergency management.  
 
Figure 4.6 - EOC’s arrangement before 9.00 am (Exercise Start). 
 
 
The team discussed available resources at this stage (e.g. building facilities, 
communication infrastructure) so that the exercise would flow more smoothly. The 
following were made available for FH personnel during the exercise:  
• A single room commonly used for meetings in the company; 
• A Radio Transmitter (RT) to communicate with other organisations (Figure 4.7a); 
• A single landline phone; 
• 2 white boards fixed onto the walls; 
• A desktop computer; 
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• A box containing an emergency kit including safe vests, gloves, buckets, non 
perishable food, torches, gas torches, blankets, respirators etc (Figure 4.7b); 
• 5 tables and a carrel; 
• A flip chart; 
• A portable white board; 
• Maps for the Wellington Area including a map with state highways, urban areas 
etc. and a map from Civil Defence (CD) showing priority routes and CD Centres 
(Figure 4.7c); 
• Emergency response forms;  
• A box containing office consumables (Figure 4.7d); 
 
 
 
a - Radio Transmitter. 
 
c - Maps Used During the Exercise. 
 
b - Fulton Hogan’s Emergency Box. 
 
d - Office Consumables. 
Figure 4.7 - Some of the Available Materials for FH’s Personnel.   
 
 
2) Exercise Observation:
 
 The participants had to arrange the EOC room after the 
formal start of the exercise at 9.00 am. Figure 4.8 shows the EOC room arranged 
by FH Team. In addition to taking notes about actions and discussions, pictures 
were taken, notes registered, discussions recorded and a survey form completed 
as part of the observation of the exercise. The data collected comprises 45 
pictures, a three page long survey and approximately 36 minutes of audio 
recordings. This sub-section uses a timeline to present injects, decision making, 
communication and discussions on the morning of the exercise; this is shown in 
Table 4.7. Annex A shows figures referred to in this table.  
While every effort was made to capture all available data in this table, it is 
inevitable that some actions, decisions or discussions may have been missed 
due to the complex and extremely dynamic nature of emergency exercises. The 
 34 
observation focused on general aspects of decision making and communication 
performed during emergency events and how they could be improved. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 - EOC Arranged After the Exercise Started.   
 
 
3) Post Exercise:
o Stress management (especially when injured staff are involved);  
  A hot debrief was conducted immediately after the exercise 
was officially finished. Participants were asked to complete a survey form (Annex 
B). The team then discussed the strengths and weaknesses that were observed 
during the exercise. The following issues were identified during the hot debrief: 
o Emergency Depot Roles clarification (EOC Manager, Information and 
Communication Manager, Road Clearing Operations Manager and 
Logistics and Staff Requirements Manager); 
o Information sharing and support from other organisations; 
o The use of NZTA Emergency Response Plan, Fulton Hogan’s procedures 
and Role Description laminated sheets; 
o EOC Room layout; 
o EOC equipment (e.g. desks, desktop computer, printer, RT); 
o EOC location at Fulton Hogan area office at Marine Parade, Petone, 
Wellington; 
o Power availability during real events and generators; and 
o Emergency box items.   
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4.2.2 QDM analysis 
Given that the exercise’s primary objective was “…to train staff in their respective roles… 
and to test the practicality of the aerial reconnaissance arrangements…”, it was 
necessary to consider the SHO in terms of physical, information, cognitive, social 
domains.  
 
Analysis of the Physical Domain 
Exercise Icarus was conceived and run as an extended functional exercise, including 
features typical of a full scale exercise. These included the simulation on the field of 
resources deployment and damage assessment operations.A few vulnerabilities 
affecting these operations were observed and reported in Table 4.6. However, with 
simulations it is considered inappropriate to judge the performance of the task and 
subtasks identified in the physical domain as they are not in reality conducted. Hence, 
the assessment matrix for the physical domain was not completed.  
 
Table 4.6 - Physical Domain Vulnerability Matrix.   
PHYSICAL DOMAIN 
SP1- Minimisation of road closures duration and variability 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities DHR DPR TTM DAM 
  - - 
 
                       - 
Office staff had problems 
identifying the location of field 
crews and what they were doing as 
well as identifying local physical 
resources 
  - - Staff shifts not implemented - 
 
 
Analysis of the Information Domain 
The intra-organisation communications analysis refers to communications between FH 
decision makers and FH personnel in the field. Inter-organisation communication was 
established with NZTA Regional Office and Opus consultants that joined NZTA EOC and 
with the Greater Wellington Regional Council that was also involved throughout the 
exercise. Communications with media and public were not performed.   
 
Table 4.7 summarises the outcomes relating to both tangible and intangible 
vulnerabilities, and the degree of fulfilment of the success indicators in the information 
domain for the decision making processes observed during the Icarus Exercise.  
 
During the exercise, a lot of information was acquired in a short amount of time. Within 
the first hour of the exercise (from 9.00 to 10.00 am), information about observed 
damage and conditions, and about the deployment of physical and human resources, 
were collected and exchanged between organisations. This reached the decision makers 
in Fulton Hogan via field personnel, and between Fulton Hogan EOC and NZTA EOC.  
 
The quality of the interactions between the decision makers was affected by information 
sharing, which was not always accurate at intra or inter organisational levels. This is the 
most critical issue that has contributed to the assessment of this domain. The information 
and dataconnectivity between the various decision makers was assessed as “limited” 
both at inter and intra organisation levels.  
 
Notwithstanding the variety of tools used to share information, there was a lack of 
adequate knowledge about how to properly manage and process the information 
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acquired. The methods used to record and update information were also observed. As a 
result the information and data richness was judged to be at a “limited” performance level. 
Finally, information reach was assessed as “fair” at inter-organisational level, despite the 
observation of a few tangible and intangible vulnerabilities. It is worth noting that it has 
not been possible to assess the information reach at intra-organisation level.   
 
 
Table 4.7 - Information Domain Vulnerability Matrix.   
INFORMATIONDOMAIN 
SI1- Level of Connectivity 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC 
  N/A N/A 
Information about available 
resources was not well 
shared between FH office 
and field personnel and 
between  FH and NZTA 
 
 
- 
SI2- Information richness 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities 
N/A  N/A N/A 
FH existing form for 
collecting data inadequate  
 
Lack of adequate knowledge of 
how to properly manage and 
process the information acquired 
N/A  N/A N/A 
Lack of an organised 
method to record and 
update information (e.g. 
GIS mapping) 
- 
SI3- Information reach 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities 
N/A  N/A N/A 
Only one person dedicated 
to answer the calls, a few 
missed calls 
Impossible to restrict of share 
information based on roles (lack 
of information selectivity  
 
 
Summarising, the success indicators pertinent to the Information Domain, namely 
(SI1)Connectivity, (SI2)Information Richness and (SI3) Information Reach, achieved FI1=2, 
FI2=2, FI3=3, respectively. Assuming the same proportion relevance αi=0.33 for all of the 
success indicators in the Information Domain, the performance of the Information 
Domain and applying Equation 3.2, the performance level is “fair”, (DI=2.33).  
 
Table 4.8 - Information Domain Assessment Matrix. 
INFORMATION DOMAIN 
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SI1) Connectivity  2 2 N/A 2  2 
SI2) Information 
richness  N/A 2 N/A 2  2 
SI3) Information reach  N/A 3 N/A 3  3 
   INTRA INTER PUBLIC DATA  DI 
Applicable:  Yes , No   SUB-TASKS  2.33 
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Analysis of the Cognitive Domain 
In general, a good level of situation awareness was observed among the participants, as 
well as a good level of training and experience. The decision makers were observed 
acting on the basis or their common sense and their experience. There was very limited 
evidence of a response manual, emergency response forms (e.g. Operational Action 
Plan Update, Message Log, Action Log, Staff Availability, Roles’ description sheets etc) 
being used at all. 
 
During the exercise, individual skills were seldom used to their full capability, especially 
during the first half of the exercise. The staff were not fully aware of their role and duties 
during the exercise and that contributed to a stressful situation and affected the unit’s 
cohesion. However, thanks to good leadership, the decision making team was re-
structured in the second half of the exercise (i.e. re-allocation of participants in suitable 
roles considering their particular skills). This change contributed to a better team 
performance in collecting, recording, sharing and communicating information with other 
organisations, deploying available physical and human resources, and making decisions. 
The ability to learn from an initial mistake is interpreted as a positive factor of resilient 
decision making (e.g. decision making showing a learning attitude).  
 
Considering the tangible and intangible vulnerabilities identified in Table 4.9, an 
assessment matrix was compiled (Table 4.10). It is worth noting that an expert judgment 
has been expressed on the degree of fulfilment of the different success indicators 
without the need to express a judgment about the performance level achieved for the 
different cognitive elements identified in this domain. These include scenario perception, 
understanding of needs, and future projection.  
 
Pertinent success indicators (SC1 Individual Situation Awareness, SC2 Level of Training 
and Experience and SC3 Intangibles of Leadership and Unit Cohesion) reached FC1=3, 
FC2=3, FC3=4, respectively. Assuming the same proportion relevance αi=0.33 for all of the 
success indicators, a “good” performance was reached in the Cognitive Domain, i.e. 
DC=3.33.  
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Table 4.9 - Cognitive Domain Vulnerability Matrix. 
COGNITIVE DOMAIN 
SC1-  individual situation awareness 
Cognitive Elements Tangible 
Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities Scenario Perception 
Understanding 
of Needs 
Future 
Projection 
N/A   - Staff were not fully aware of their role and duties 
SC2-  level of training and experience 
Cognitive Elements Tangible 
Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities Scenario Perception 
Understanding 
of needs 
Future 
Projection 
N/A   - Individuals skills were seldom used to their full capability 
   
Absence of  
decision making 
support tools for 
enhancing the 
knowledge 
management 
 
SC3-  intangibles of leadership and unit cohesion 
Cognitive Elements Tangible 
Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities Scenario Perception 
Understanding 
of needs 
Future 
Projection 
N/A   - 
Participants were not 
associated to  suitable roles 
considering their particular 
skills 
 
Table 4.10 - Cognitive Domain Assessment Matrix. 
COGNITIVE DOMAIN 
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SC1) individual situation awareness   3 
SC2) level of training and experience   3 
SC3) intangibles of leadership and unit cohesion   4 
    DC 
Applicable:  Yes , No    3.33 
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Analysis of the Social Domain 
The exercise was part of NZTA annual training and did not include the participation of 
the emergency management agencies(e.g. local/region Civil Defence EOC). Given this, 
the quality of decision making processes in the social domain was assessed only taking 
into consideration coordination of actions with participating agencies.  
 
Table 4.11 summarises the main issues identified through participants’ feedback as part 
of the post-exercise debrief. It highlights the need for a well established working process 
among organisations. During the post-exercise debrief it was emphasised that priorities 
must be defined by the NZTA. The consultants and contractors were required to be 
ready to organise the responses according to the priorities defined.  
 
 
Table 4.11 - Social Domain Vulnerability Matrix.   
SOCIAL DOMAIN 
SS3 -coordination of actions with all involved agencies. 
Cognitive Elements Tangible 
Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities INTRA INTER 
  - 
A well established coordination of action with 
all involved organisations has yet to be 
developed 
 
 
Accounting for the observed vulnerability, the degree of fulfilment of the success 
indicators SS3 Coordination of Actions with all Involved Agencies was evaluated as 
“limited” (SS3=2). Being the only success indicator applicable to the case of Icarus 
Exercise, the performance for the Social Domain was assessed to be “limited” DS=2 
(Table 4.12).  
 
Table 4.12 Social Domain Assessment Matrix. 
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 SS1) responsiveness to the needs of emergency management 
agencies   N/A 
SS2) technical advice to leading emergency management 
agencies and lifeline groups   N/A 
SS3) coordination of actions with all involved agencies   2 
    DS 
 Applicable:  Yes , No    22 
 
Overall analysis 
Considering the domain scores and assuming the same proportion relevance γd =0.25 
for all domains, the performance is calculated as DM=2.55 which means that the 
resilience of the decision making process is classified as “Fair” (adequate but some 
areas of dysfunction with limited adaptability; not effective in all circumstances; limited in 
solutions delivery; some feedback to involved organisations). 
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4.3 Capital Quake: Ruaumoko Exercise 2006 
 
The following subsections present the description of exercise activities and the analysis 
of the Capital Quake Exercise. 
 
4.3.1 Background and activities 
On the 14-15th November 2006 a national civil defence exercise was held to test 
arrangements for managing a major earthquake on the Wellington fault. This exercise 
tested central and regional civil defence emergency plans. It was also an opportunity for 
key organisations to practice their response arrangements.  
 
Roading organisations that agreed to participate in the exercise included Fulton Hogan, 
NZTA Wellington regional office, MWH, OPUS, and Wellington City Council (WCC) 
roading division.  The objectives of the exercise for these organisations were to: 
1) Test disaster response arrangementsand identify how these disaster response 
plans can be improved; 
2) build skills and capacitywithin these organisations to ensure that staff are aware 
of their roles and responsibilities and build up the number and skills of staff 
available to respond; 
3) to engage staff in the importance of planning for major crisis events; and 
4) to buildteams across organisations that are able to work effectively together in 
times of crisis.   
 
A specific objective for NZTA was to test the interfaces between the NZTA regional office, 
NZTA national office and the Ministry of Transport led Transport Cluster. 
 
Scenario 
The exercise assumed that an earthquake took place at 5:30am on the morning of the 
14th November and role played the first two days following the earthquake. Damage and 
information about the road network was provided to participants through a series of 
injects. Annex C presents the scenario scene setter and the timetable details with the 
respective injects. These include extra injects, which were used depending on the 
organisations’ response actions. 
 
 
State Highway Overview 
The NZTA national office was activated early on day 1 (based in Wellington, but in a real 
event this would be run from Auckland). Figures 4.9a and 4.9b show the initial activities 
at the NZTA Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) room. Upon its activation, NZTA 
personnel worked on a backlog of information about the event. It took 40 minutes to 
process available information. Figures 4.10a, 4.10b, 4.10c and 4.10d show the recording 
and processing activities conducted in the EOC room.  
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(a) Discussions at the NZTA national office EOC room 
 
 
(b) Personnel at NZTA national office EOC room 
Figure 4.9 - NZTA National office activation. 
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(a) White board with the summary of events 
and actions 
 
(b) Recording of latest info on events 
 
(c) Forms used in the response  (d) Graphical representation of the available 
resources and actions 
Figure 4.10 - Recording and processing activities at the NZTA National office.  
 
The first priority for the NZTA National office was to activate resources from outside of 
the region and to start with regional reconnaissance. Early in the morning of Day 1, there 
was little communication with the NZTA regional office in Wellington due to failures in 
communications. Late morning on Day 1 some information started filtering through from 
NZTA Regional office into NZTA National office.  This included injects such as damage 
observations and some high level information about what contractor resources are where. 
Due to limited information availability about the road closures in the Wellington region, 
NZTA National office personnel decided to allocate resources to re-open State Highway 
around Petone and Lower Hutt. It was concluded that State Highway 2 would be a “no 
go” area due the significant impact of the earthquake fault.  
 
On Day 1, the NZTA Regional Office were yet to set up a formal EOC so it was NZTA 
National office that had a greater understanding of the overall situation.  
 
During the morning of Day 2, more local level awareness of the situation began to form. 
The NZTA Regional EOC was established (starting from 7:30am) and communications 
between the Regional and National EOC’s became more regular. As a result better 
quality information started to flow from mid morning. The NZTA Regional office was 
actively exercising their team from 7:30 am to 12:30 pm.  
 
This allowed for information sharing and collaboration between NZTA national and 
regional offices. During these interactions, a few issues were observed; they include: 
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• Even though satellite phones were available at the national office, there was no 
way to use them because the regional office did not have similar devices; 
• there were doubts and questions around who to address the reports to at the 
NZTA regional office; 
• different offices required different levels of information. For example, maps 
produced at the National office were strategic and showed limited details of the 
network, whereas regional office’s maps were very comprehensive and very 
detailed; and 
• no formal risk assessment was performed to reach the conclusion of that 
resources should be allocated to State Highway 1.  
 
 
 
4.3.2 QDM analysis 
Given the exercise’s objective of testing all functionalities and interactions between 
NZTA offices, it was possible to consider involved SHOs in terms of physical, information, 
cognitive, social domains.  
 
Analysis of the Physical Domain during the Capital Quake Exercise 
The EOC was promptly set up within 15 minutes of the commencement of the Capital 
Quake exercise. This fulfilled Disaster Response Plan (DRP) requirements and roles and 
responsibilities were assigned between the most senior staff members present. An initial 
briefing on the earthquake which set the stage for the operational response and setting 
priorities was also conducted.  
However, as the exercise progressed each participating organisation seemed to have its 
own set of priorities; this often resulted in conflicting actions. For example, NZTA New 
Zealand’s Emergency Response Plan Document suggested the following priorities with 
regard to response actions: 1) the importance of the highway; 2) resources available, 
and 3) practicality of action. However, Fulton Hogan’s Disaster Response Plan (DRP) 
states “Re-opening priority access routes is the main priority unless Civil Defence 
Controller advises otherwise”. As a result staff and resources in Fulton Hogan were 
allocated to re-opening priority access routes as follows:  
• Operational capability of the Wellington International Airport Corporation (WIAC). 
This was of utmost priority to enable emergency airlifts and delivery of relief 
personnel and supplies; 
• road access (route) between the airport and the hospital to enable movement of 
the injured etc; and  
• general road clearance along major arterial routes within the city. 
 
Based on these priorities, Fulton Hogan tallied up available resources using whiteboards 
and maps and assigned a total of 3 road crews for reconnaissance, 2 road crews for 
general road clearance, 1 for the Airport, 1 for road clearance along Rongotai access 
route and 1 crew for food and fuel supplies. Shortfalls in resource requirements were 
noted and contacts established with other depots for assistance. Fulton Hogan activated 
a mutual aid agreement which was in place with the equipment hire organisation 
HireQuip. This meant that plant and equipment requisition was judged unnecessary. 
There were ongoing communications with field crew for updates, reaffirmation of road 
clearance focus and priorities, morale boosting and welfare concerns. 
 
The lifelines CDEM group followed priorities according to the Wellington Region CDEM 
Group Plan document. CDEM priorities include preservation of life, government, 
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maintenance of law and order, property protection and guarantee of essential services 
including transport services. Hence, re-establishing roading and runway access 
observed in the Capital Quake exercise was part of CDEM priorities.  
 
Another issue identified with regards to priority setting, was the safety of staff. A 
particular example is that of Fulton Hogan’s personnel that were trapped in the tunnel. A 
few participants expressed concern about how such an incident would be managed in a 
real event. The post-exercise debrief revealed that the safety of colleagues was among 
the top priorities for staff, but this was not clearly expressed either in the NZTA’s 
Emergency Response Plan or in Fulton Hogan’s Disaster Response Plan. 
 
Table 4.13 summaries the tangible and intangible vulnerabilities observed during the 
Capital Quake Exercise for the Physical Domain. In particular vulnerabilities were 
identified considering the success indicator SP2- Maximisation of accessibility to strategic 
services and places, which reflected the priorities agreed by all of the organisations 
involved. 
 
 
Table 4.13 - Physical Domain Vulnerability Matrix. 
PHYSICAL DOMAIN 
SP2- Maximisation of accessibility to strategic services and places 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities DHR DPR TTM DAM 
  - - 
 
                       - 
Office staff had problems 
identifying where field crews were 
and what they were doing, and 
locating physical resources 
  - - 
Resource optimization options 
seemed to be very limited 
during the early stages of the 
response 
- 
  - - Staff shifts was not implemented - 
-  - - 
Decision-makers were not 
certain of the range of available 
options 
- 
 
Considering these vulnerabilities, the deployment of physical and human resources 
during the Capital Quake (2006) exercise was operated at a “limited” level DP=2 as 
shown in Table 4.14. 
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Table 4.14 - Physical Domain Assessment Matrix. 
PHYSICAL DOMAIN 
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 SP1) Minimisation of road closures 
duration and variability  - - - -  N/A 
SP2) Maximisation accessibility to 
strategic services and places     2 2 - -  2 
SP3) Minimisation response and 
recovery costs  - - - -  N/A 
   DHR DPR TTM DAM  DP 
Applicable:  Yes , No   SUB-TASKS  2 
 
 
Analysis of the Information Domain during the Capital Quake Exercise 
Information sharing played a major role in the response operation of the Capital Quake 
Exercise. Participating organisations collected information using available resources in 
the EOC. The communication tools (satellite phone, cellular phones, landlines, emails, 
and radio transmitters) were the main resources used to collect information from other 
organisations. There was regular communication about resource availability with other 
contractor installations,’ this included updates on work schedules and damage reports. 
Communication was maintained at 1-hour intervals through open-channel reports. 
However communication hitches were experienced with other agencies like the 
Wellington Emergency Management Office (WEMO).  NZTA and WIAL (Wellington 
International Airport Ltd) had no satellite phone. 
 
Some organisations assigned personnel to be in charge of each communication tool (e.g. 
NZTA National Office). Different results in the information and data handling and sharing 
were observed as a consequence of these different practices. Organisations that 
standardised information and data processing often achieved a higher level of 
consistency and efficiency. Inconsistent and unreliable information was obtained from 
those organisations that did not clearly assign their personnel with specific tasks. 
 
Information about the location, damage, time and impact of the incidents was collected 
during the exercise. Nevertheless, available information was rarely used in all 
organisations. Instead, personnel’s knowledge played a significant role in shaping the 
understanding of the situation on the site. 
 
A general tendency of being reactive to incoming information was observed, as opposed 
to a more pro-active approach. However, pro-active information seeking was also 
identified in certain organisations. It occurred particularly when the information was 
needed to make a decision. One of the reasons causing the reactive approach was 
identified in NZTA Regional office, where the personnel were overwhelmed by the 
incoming information early in the second day of the exercise. 
 
All organisations managed the collected data items using standard forms, plotted them 
on maps, and recorded incoming information in a log report. It has to be noted that one 
organisation (Fulton Hogan Petone) did not prepare maps for the emergency exercise. 
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Instead, hand-drawn maps were used to plot the situation, based on received information. 
Overall, adopted practices worked well in providing a big picture understanding of the 
emergency situation.  
 
After receiving and processing data items and information, most participant organisations 
had the tendency to keep collected information for their own response operations. 
Limited efforts were observed to disseminate the compiled information to other 
organisations. The exception was NZTA National Office’s effort to prepare regular media 
releases, as suggested in the NZTA Emergency Response Plan. 
 
Table 4.15 summarises the tangible and intangible vulnerabilities observed during the 
Capital Quake Exercise for the Information Domain of the decision making process. In 
particular, vulnerabilities comprised success indicators S I3- Information reach, while no 
particular vulnerabilities were highlighted for the other two success indicators of the 
Information Domain.  
 
 
Table 4.15-Information Domain Vulnerability Matrix.   
INFORMATIONDOMAIN 
SI3 - Information reach 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities 
  - - 
Some organisations did not 
assign personnel to collect, 
share and process data and 
information 
- 
 - - - - 
Limited efforts were observed in 
disseminating the compiled 
information to other organisations 
 - - - - 
Difficulties in transferring/ 
explaining actions and 
information from the NZTA 
National Office CDEM and 
operations rooms 
- -   Absence of agreed templates/rules 
Very strong concerns in releasing 
information to media  
 
The connectivity observed at inter and intra organisations level was rated as “good”, 
whereas the connectivity with the public was assessed as “limited”. The information 
richness reached a “fair” level in all of the information domain sub-tasks. This was due to 
the multiple tools used to share the information and because personnel were allocated to 
specialised information-sharing activities. The information reach both at inter and intra 
organisations level provided regular, simultaneous and selective communication, but it 
was affected by the various vulnerabilities previously identified, therefore it was judged 
as “limited”.  
 
Table 4.16 shows the assessment matrix for this domain. The success indicators 
pertinent to the Information Domain, namely (SI1)Connectivity, (SI2) Information Richness 
and (SI3)Information Reach were targeted with a degree of fulfilment respectively of FI1 
=3.25, FI2=3, FSI3=2.33. Assuming the same proportion relevance αi=0.33 for all of the 
success indicators in the Information Domain, the performance for the Information 
Domain has been evaluated according to Equation 3.2 at a “fair” level DI=2.86  
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Table 4.16 - Information Domain Assessment Matrix. 
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SI1) Connectivity  4 4 2 3  3.25 
SI2) Information richness  3 3 N/A 3  3 
SI3) Information reach  2 2 N/A 3  2.33 
   INTRA INTER PUBLIC DATA  DI 
Applicable:  Yes , No   SUB-TASKS  2.86 
 
 
 
Analysis of the Cognitive Domain during the Capital Quake Exercise 
No particular tangible or intangible vulnerabilities were observed in this domain. 
Therefore, the vulnerability matrix for the Cognitive Domain was not completed. It is 
worth noting that the Capital Quake exercise role-play was taken seriously and the 
decision making was pro-active and result-driven. Individual situation awareness and 
training/experience were both assessed at a “fair” level of performance. There was an 
excellent understanding of the affected area, which enhanced quick response and 
decision-making processes. Decisions were made relying a lot on individual knowledge. 
 
The success indicators pertinent to the Cognitive Domain, namely (SC1) Individual 
Situation Awareness, (SC2)Level of Training and Experience and (SC3)Intangibles of 
Leadership and Unit Cohesion were targeted. Their respective degree of fulfilment 
respectively were FC1=3, FC2=3, FC3 =2. Therefore, assuming the same proportion 
relevance αi=0.33 for all the success indicators, the Cognitive Domain during the Capital 
Quake Exercise was performed at a “fair” level DC=2.67. Table 4.17 summarises these 
results.  
 
Table 4.17 - Cognitive Domain Assessment Matrix. 
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SC1) individual situation awareness   3 
SC2) level of training and experience   3 
SC3) intangibles of leadership and unit cohesion   2 
    DC 
Applicable:  Yes , No    2.67 
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Analysis of the Social Domain during Capital Quake Exercise 
The assessment of this domain was mostly based on the activities during and after the 
exercise (debrief). Table 4.18 summarises this domain’s assessment. The NZTA 
decision makers demonstrated very little concern about learning Civil Defence's priorities 
for this particular event. Therefore the responsivenessto the needs of emergency 
management agencieshas been judged as “fair” FS1=2. On the other hand, a “fair” level 
of technical advice was provided to the emergency management agencies and lifeline 
groups FS2=3. Regarding the coordination of actions with all involved agencies, it has 
been performed at a “fair” level: the third success indicator of the Social Domain resulted 
FS3=2.5. 
 
Assuming the same proportion relevance αi=0.33 for all the success indicators, the 
Social Domain during the Capital Quake Exercise was performed at a “fair” level DS=2.5. 
 
Table 4.18 - Social Domain Assessment Matrix. 
SOCIAL DOMAIN 
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 SS1) responsiveness to the needs of emergency management 
agencies   2 
SS2) technical advice to leading emergency management 
agencies and lifeline groups   3 
SS3) coordination of actions with all involved agencies   2.5 
    DS 
Applicable:  Yes , No    2.5 
 
Overall analysis 
Considering the domain scores and assuming the same proportion relevance γd =0.25 
for all domains, the performance is computed as DM=2.67 which means that the 
resilience of the decision making process is classified “fair” (adequate but some areas of 
dysfunction with limited adaptability; not effective in all circumstances; limited in solutions 
delivery; some feedback to involved organisations). 
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4.4 Ruaumoko Exercise 2008 
 
The following subsections describe exercise activities and the analysis of the Ruaumoko 
Exercise 2008. 
 
4.4.1 Background and activities 
On the morning of 13th March 2008, various lifelines organisations, and Civil Defence 
groups participated in the Ruaumoko Exercise. This was organised as a Tier 4 national-
level exercise (a joint local government and central government exercise) in accordance 
with the CDEM National Exercise Programme.  
 
The exercise aimed to test New Zealand's all-of-nation arrangements for responding to a 
major disaster with particular focus on roles and responsibilities, arrangements and 
connections between local, regional, a national and international agencies.  
 
The exercise included features typical of a full scale exercise, namely the simulation, 
resource assessment and deployment and damage assessment operations. For the 
NZTA National office, the challenge was how to cope with the massive evacuation 
planned for residents from the 5 Km radius blast zone. It was expected that the 
evacuation would cause significant congestion on motorways and State Highway (SH), 
SH 1 to Hamilton as well as SH 2 to the east. Another issue raised by the exercise was 
security (domestic and life support) of staff for both the NZTA and its suppliers, given the 
potential severity of the event.  
 
Scenario 
The assumed scenario was a volcanic eruption located in the inner Manukau harbour, 
which was expected to severely damage all land transport and to severely affect the 
North Island.  
 
The scenario was based on a possible volcanic eruption somewhere in the Auckland 
Volcanic Field (Figure 4.11). The exercise commenced with the identification of precursor 
activity in the form of seismicity in the Auckland region during November 2007, such that 
planning meetings were required.  In early 2008 unusual and sustained seismicity in the 
Auckland region prompted further attention until it was clear that a volcanic eruption was 
becoming imminent due to increasing seismicity. Earthquakes with intensity equal to 
Mercalli Intensity 6-7 were recorded more frequently in last 24-48 hours before the 
eruption.  
 
The scenario included:  
• Violent explosions caused by magma coming into contact with water; 
sound/pressure shock waves and complete devastation 1-3 km from vent;  
• extremely violent base surge phenomenon with turbulent ground-hugging flows of 
ash/gas with a speed of 50-300 km/hr;  
• ash fall; 
• fountains in the vent area only lasting from 1 week to several months;  
• lava flows crushing and burning everything in path in the area 1-10 km from vent 
and lasting from several weeks to several months;  
• risk of widespread fire from hot ash, lava, or disrupted gas supply lines in the 
area 1-10 km from vent; and 
• asphyxiating gases (CO, CO2, HF, SO2) accompanying lava flows in the area 1-
5km from vent.  
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Physical impacts included damage to infrastructure and transportation utilities (including 
roads, ports, airports) and disruption to service of lifeline utilities (including electricity, gas, 
fuel, telecommunications, water). The damage from the eruption severely affected the 
ability of the remainder of the North Island to function and provide support to cope with 
refugees.  
 
Road controlling authorities were asked to understand and simulate the reaction for the 
city population during the volcanic eruption in order to predict the level of panic, the 
direction of trips and the main purposes of trips. Self evacuation was the primary means 
of evacuation of the 60% of residents from the 5 Km radius blast zone. As a result Civil 
Defence moved 40% of people south and encouraged the 60% who were self evacuating 
to do the same. For the NZTA this created pressure on the motorway and SH 1 to 
Hamilton as well as SH 2 to the east, this was also escalated because this evacuation 
coincided with the normal evening rush hour peak flow 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11 – Ruaumoko Exercise 2008 scenario: volcanic eruption located in the inner 
Manukau harbour. 3 km-radius devastation’ zone ‘and 5km-radius evacuation zone 
according to the Auckland Volcanic Contingency Plan.  
 
 
Observed activities  
Our research team members were distributed throughout 5 different locations (NZTA 
National Office in Wellington, Group Emergency Operations Centre, GEOC Auckland, 
NZTA Northcote Traffic Management; National GEOC Wellington and Evacuation 
Coordinator Support at Waitakere EOC) in order to comprehensively observe the 
exercise.  
 
Our team observed that participating organisations had substantially different levels of 
awareness of the initial situation (impact, damage and vulnerabilities). Upon the 
introduction of initial injects, organisations faced a common issue, which was to predict 
how the volcanic eruption could affect the immediate and extended surrounding areas 
and weather these impacts aligned with assumptions made during previous planning. 
For instance, the NZTA National office showed very limited knowledge about affected 
area/assets, personnel, volcanic explosion consequences, and how traffic behaviour and 
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traffic management should change in the face of this chaos. At the regional level, the 
NZTA relied on previous knowledge about the network, but it ignored the fact that 
evacuation patterns could be significantly different to those observed during other types 
of events. The Group Emergency Operations Centre (GEOC) in Auckland had access to 
a considerable amount of scientific information about the implications of the eruption, but 
it had a limited understanding of where to evacuate people and had different views on 
how traffic would be affected.  
 
Situation awareness had considerable influence on how participants understood and 
proactively managed keystone vulnerabilities. For instance, the NZTA National Office did 
not take an active role during the exercise. The participating personnel were reluctant to 
get involved and decided to wait for requests from the NZTA Regional Office. Overall, it 
was observed that participating organisations were waiting for information rather than 
proactively seeking it. One exception was the Bay of Plenty(BOP) Regional Council that 
proactively engaged in seeking information on estimated arrival numbers and responding 
by directing the appropriate amount of evacuees to their respective welfare centres and 
feeding this information back to others.  
 
The different perceptions of the initial situation were mostly due to difficulties in 
assimilating incoming information. Most participating organisations relied heavily on 
email communication, which would, in principle allow them to share text documents, 
maps and other various data about the event. Due to the magnitude of the event, 
participating organisations were swamped with very large and varied communication 
attempts. These eventually did not materialise into useful and reliable information that 
could support decision making. On the contrary, it was often observed that staff would 
spend significant time dealing with communication troubles (e.g. email sizes, spam filters 
and delays).  
 
These difficulties were clearly reflected in the way the NZTA processed information. At 
the national level, staff decided to use as little information technology as they could, with 
the exception of email messages. At the regional level spreadsheets for logging phone 
calls and other acquired information were created during the exercise. NZTA regional 
staff recognised that they should not rely only on emails and phones as those could be 
unavailable in a real event. Nevertheless, no ideas on how to overcome these issues 
were discussed.  
 
Various levels of adaptive capacity were observed. Mostly, the participating 
organisations managed to adjust as the exercise progressed. For example, the 
expansion of the eruption affected area prompted the NZTA regional office to quickly 
reorganise the traffic management arrangements. Nevertheless, the NZTA national office 
showed poor adaptive capability after initial communications with its regional office. The 
national office personnel avoided asking questions and/or requesting further information 
about response actions.  
 
 
4.4.2 QDM analysis 
The performance of participating SHOs was evaluated in terms ofInformation, Cognitive 
and Social domains.  
 
The exercise aimed to analyse the performance of resource allocation using a volcanic 
eruption simulation, however not enough data was collected for the analysis of the task 
and subtasks identified in the Physical domain.  No assessment matrix for the physical 
domain has been completed.Nevertheless we highlight vulnerabilities in the physical 
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domain (Table 4.19), that impacted on the deployment of physical resources and on 
temporary traffic management. 
 
 
Table 4.19 - Physical Domain Vulnerability Matrix.   
PHYSICAL DOMAIN 
SP1- Minimisation of road closures duration and variability 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities DHR DPR TTM DAM 
- -  - 
No traffic modelling was 
implemented to understand the 
possible traffic scenarios                     
Lack of a comprehensive 
awareness of the traffic behaviour 
-  - - 
Lack of shelter, food, and water 
for evacuated people  
Insufficient fuel and extra 
vehicles to evacuate people  
 
 
 
 
Analysis of the Information Domain during Ruaumoko Exercise 2008 
The intra-organisation communication analysed in this section refers to the 
communication undertaken among NZTA decision makers at the Wellington and 
Auckland offices. The inter-organisation communication analysed refers to the 
communication established between the aforementioned NZTA offices, the Waitakere 
EOC and the two GEOC involved. Communication with media and public was not 
performed.   
 
Tables 4.20 and 4.21 summarise the outcomes in terms of tangible and intangible 
vulnerabilities and degree of fulfilment of the success indicators in the information 
domain. 
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Table 4.20 - Information Domain Vulnerability Matrix.   
INFORMATIONDOMAIN 
SI1- Level of Connectivity 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC 
  - - 
Communication by e mail 
inefficient and delayed 
many times 
No ideas about possible 
alternatives in case of 
telecommunication unavailability 
  - - 
File size attached with 
email communication not 
reduced to the minimal 
- 
  - - 
Very poor use of 
information technology to 
collect, analyse and share 
information 
 
  - - No shift to phone due to e-mail miscommunications - 
SI2- Information richness 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities 
  - - 
Too much use of acronyms, 
some unnecessary and 
misleading 
 
  - - 
Lack of a consistent email 
protocol for emergency 
response 
 
SI3- - Information reach 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities 
 - - - 
 Poor and disorganised 
information sharing, performed 
with limited continuity 
 - - -  Confused priority identification 
 
Table 4.21 -  Information Domain Assessment Matrix. 
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SI1) Connectivity  2 2 N/A 2  2 
SI2) Information richness  3 3 N/A 3  3 
SI3) Information reach  2 3 N/A 2  2.33 
   INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC DATA  DI 
Applicable:  Yes , No   SUB-TASKS  2.44 
 
 54 
 
Analysis of the Cognitive Domain during the Ruaumoko Exercise 2008 
The analysis of the Cognitive Domainaims to assess the decision maker’s knowledge, 
capabilities, techniques, and procedures. Unfortunately, during the Ruaumoko Exercise 
2008, our research team got the sense that some decision makers were not fully 
engaged with the exercise.This attitude resulted in them taking a passive role and in a 
lack of understanding of the evolving scenario and pending issues (Table 4.22).  This 
may not be reflective of their potential performance in responding to a real event. 
Considering the observed tangible and intangible vulnerabilities the Cognitive Domain 
was assessed as shown in Table 4.23.  
 
 
Table 4.22 -Cognitive Domain Vulnerability Matrix.   
COGNITIVE DOMAIN 
SC1 - individual situation awareness 
Cognitive Elements Tangible 
Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities Scenario Perception 
Understanding 
of Needs 
Future 
Projection 
 -  - 
Lack of awareness about volcanic 
explosion consequences; affected 
areas;  impact on traffic behaviour   
 -  - Lack of understanding about dimension and criticality of the event 
-  - - Lack of awareness about available personnel and assets 
SC2 - level of training and experience 
Cognitive Elements Tangible 
Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities Scenario Perception 
Understanding 
of Needs 
Future 
Projection 
   
 Lack of knowledge about 
vulnerability analysis and impact 
scenarios available in NZ to 
understand the potential impact of 
volcanic risk 
SC3 - intangibles of leadership and unit cohesion. 
Cognitive Elements Tangible 
Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities Scenario Perception 
Understanding 
of Needs 
Future 
Projection 
   
 Passive role during the exercise; 
reluctance to get involved and be 
proactive 
 
 
 55 
 
 
Table 4.23 - Cognitive Domain Assessment Matrix. 
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SC1) individual situation awareness   2 
SC2) level of training and experience   3 
SC3) intangibles of leadership and unit cohesion.   2 
    DC 
Applicable:  Yes , No    2.33 
 
 
 
Analysis of the Social Domain during the Ruaumoko Exercise 2008 
The quality of decision making in the Social Domain is assessed by investigating the 
responsiveness to the needs and the technical advice provided to emergency 
management agencies and the coordination of actions with all involved agencies. No 
relevant vulnerabilities were observed for the Social domain, which was performed at a 
“fair” level. Meetings between decision makers of the different agencies took place 
frequently. A scientific advisors group was formed, this group worked closely with 
GEOCs to provide injects and valuable advice. Table 4.24 presents the assessment 
matrix for the Social Domain.  
 
Table 4.24 - Social Domain Assessment Matrix. 
SOCIAL DOMAIN 
A
pp
lic
ab
ili
ty
 
 
D
eg
re
e 
of
 
Fu
lfi
lm
en
t 
SU
CC
ES
S 
IN
D
IC
AT
O
RS
 SS1) responsiveness to the needs of emergency management 
agencies   3 
SS2) technical advice to leading emergency management 
agencies and lifeline groups   3 
SS3) coordination of actions with all involved agencies   2 
    DS 
Applicable:  Yes , No    2.67 
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Overall analysis 
Considering the domain scores and assuming the same proportion relevance γd =0.25 
for all domains, the performance is computed as DM=2.48 which means that the 
resilience of the decision making process is classified “fair” (adequate but some areas of 
dysfunction with limited adaptability; not effective in all circumstances; limited in solutions 
delivery; some feedback to involved organisations). 
 
 
4.5 Mount Ruapehu Volcanic Eruption Event 
 
The following subsections present the description and the analysis of the decision 
making process during the Mount Ruapehu Volcanic Eruption event. 
 
4.5.1 Background and activities 
On 25th September 2007, the Ruapehu Volcano, located in the New Zealand’s North 
Island, erupted. According to the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 
the eruption occurred without warning at 8:20pm and lasted for about ten minutes. As a 
precaution, the ski fields were closed the following day and sixty people from Aorangi 
and Ruapehu huts were evacuated. The adjacent State Highway was also closed until 
possible damage was assessed. The eruption was accompanied by magnitude M=2.9 
ground shaking that lasted seven minutes. An injured climber was the only direct victim 
from the event.  
 
The eruption prompted regional Police, Civil Defence and NZTA’s regional contractors to 
activate emergency response procedures. The event received attention from 
international, national, regional and local media as well by government bodies.  
 
The eruption caused some concern for the local population, who criticised authorities for 
a lack of communication. Rumours about a failure in the warning system were circulated. 
However, the Conservation Department Tongariro acting manager said that the alarm 
system had worked and the Police Area Commander advised that steps were taken to 
communicate with those in the region in accordance with the emergency response plan. 
The failure of the cell-phone text message alert occurred because the event created a 
magnitude M=2.9 earthquake, while the alert threshold is a magnitude M=3.4. Ruapehu’s 
ski fields were expected to reopen on the day after the event, but they were re-opened 
three days after the event. Many tourists complained about the ski field closures, 
because the event happened in the middle of the busy school holiday period. No 
property damage was reported and roads were closed for damage assessment until 11 
pm on the night of the event. The mountain’s extreme unpredictability and potential for 
further eruptions highlighted the importance of having a good warning system in the 
region and well defined response procedures and plans.  
 
 
Contractor’s Experience 
An interview was conducted at the Work Infrastructure’s office at Taumarunui on the 26th 
September 2007. After the Mt. Ruapehu eruption Works Infrastructure were alerted via 
the after-hours emergency system (around 9:40 pm), Police informed NZTA personnel, 
who called Works Infrastructure’s after-hours service and the responsible person on call. 
The decision was made to set up road blocks and signage while assessing the road 
conditions. State Highways SH 1, SH 46, SH 47, SH48, SH4 and SH 4 around the 
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mountain were closed (Figure 4.12). To do this, road blocks were located at Ohakune, 
Manunui, Waiouru and Rangipo (Figure 4.13).  
 
A road block was also put in place at Manunui, but the section of SH 4 until National 
Park Village was not closed. In this section of road drivers were informed about the 
situation and asked to drive carefully. Eight light trucks with road management gear 
(signs, barriers, flashing lights) and 14 people were used to set up the road blocks which 
were moved from the local depots (Taumarunui and Raetihi and Turangi, see Fig. 4.13). 
The roads were re-opened at approximately 11:30 pm. Two staff were left at Turangi to 
monitor the situation over night. 
 
 
Figure 4.12 - Road Closures During the Event (highlighted in black). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13 - Road Blocks, Depots and Personnel Location. 
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A driving assessment of the road network was completed which evaluated the condition 
of pavements, culverts, signage etc.) and included stopping for a visual assessment at 
critical points (mainly bridges) to check for possible damage. All costs involved in the 
response for Ruapehu’s Eruption (mainly petrol and wages) were claimed from the NZTA.  
 
 
New Zealand Police’s Experience 
An interview with the local Police Inspector was conducted at Taumarunui on the 29th 
September 2007. According to the Police Inspector, after the volcanic eruption the Police 
received a 111 phone call from a ski operator. It was noticed that the Eruption Detection 
System (EDS) did not work as the earthquake event accompanying the volcanic eruption 
was of the magnitude M=2.9. The EDS system is set up to be triggered by a M=3.4 event. 
The policeman recommended that the system must be set up to be triggered at a lower 
magnitude.   
 
The decision to alert Police staff and close roads in the region of Mt. Ruapehu was made 
by the Police Inspector based on 17 years experience in the area and on lessons 
identified after the 1995 Mt. Ruapehu volcanic eruption. Hence, State Highways 
surrounding the Mt. Ruapehu were closed (SH 1, SH 46, SH 47, SH48 and SH4). Road 
blocks were put in place at Ohakune, Manunui, Waiouru and Rangipo. 
 
The situation was managed using the principles from the Coordinated Incident 
Management System (CIMS). According to the standard procedures of CIMS, the 
Communication Centre of Taumarunui Police contacted the Contractor for the region (i.e. 
Works). The Police Inspector emphasized that the contractor was slow to respond to the 
incident (i.e. close the roads) due to the different locations of their resources on respect 
in the incident area. While waiting for the contractors, the police staff drove along the 
closed roads to check its condition. The NZTA and the consultant were not contacted by 
the Police, who coordinated the response with the contractor.   
 
After the roads were closed and the contractor arrived in the area, the Police Inspector 
reached the Emergency Operation Centre that was established at Whakakapa, in the 
Department of Conservation (DoC) Office. A DoC staff member took the role of the 
Incident Controller using CIMS protocols. Local volunteers, who knew the region, were 
appointed to cover the different roles required by the CIMS structure. 
 
The actions/decision making on the night of the event comprised the evacuation of 60 
people from Iwikau Village to Hotel Chateaux. As the situation became clearer, an 
alternative option to go back to their accommodations was immediately granted. Also, 
roads were closed for assessment until the contractor had verified the road’s safety 
condition. The last decision concerning the event was to close the ski fields until the 
situation was under control. 
 
GNS Science, Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences, monitored and evaluated 
the volcano activity regularly until a final decision about safety could be made. On the 
day after the event, two meetings per day (4.30pm and 6.00pm) were scheduled until the 
situation could be considered as completely safe. 
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4.5.2 QDM analysis  
This section presents the analysis of the Quality Decision Making processes after the 
Mount Ruapehu Volcanic Eruption, focusing on the Contractors’ response. Due to the 
limited criticality of the event from the SHO point of view, the analysis is restricted to the 
assessment of the Physical and Information domains.  
 
Analysis of the Physical Domain after the Ruapehu event 
The Physical Domain during the event involved two major decisions: evacuation of 
people, and road closure for assessment. The evacuation process was easy to operate 
as few people were evacuated from Aorangi and Ruapehu huts to the Hotel Chateaux. 
Regarding the road closure, all the State Highways around the mountain were closed 
putting in place road blocks. Damage assessment was done visually by driving all of the 
possible affected roads and by stopping at most critical sections (e.g. bridges) for 
comprehensive evaluation. The road closures and assessments were initially operated 
by the local Police as contractor resources were spread around different locations in 
respect to the incident area. 
 
The road assessment was conducted a second time by the contractor driving through the 
network and stopping at possible damaged road assets (e.g. pavement, culverts, 
signage) and at critical links (identified mainly with bridges).  
 
Table 4.25 summarises the vulnerabilities that affected the decision making process in 
the physical domain.  
 
 
 
Table 4.25 - Physical Domain Vulnerability Matrix after Ruapehu event. 
PHYSICAL DOMAIN 
SP1 - Minimisation of road closures duration and variability 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities DHR DPR TTM DAM 
    different location of HR and PR on respect to incident Area 
 
SP2 - maximisation of accessibility to strategic services and places 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities DHR DPR TTM DAM 
    Lack of redundancy in the network  
SP3 -  minimization of response and recovery costs 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities DHR DPR TTM DAM 
     - 
 
Despite these vulnerabilities, it is assessed that the deployment of physical and human 
resources during Mount Ruapehu event was operated at a “fair” level DP=3 as shown in 
Table 4.26. 
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Table 4.26 - Physical Domain Assessment Matrix after Mount Ruapehu event. 
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SP1) Minimisation of road closures duration and variability   3 
SP2) Maximisation accessibility to strategic services and places      3 
SP3) Minimisation response and recovery costs   3 
    DP 
Applicable:  Yes , No    3 
 
 
 
Analysis of the Information Domain during Mount Ruapehu event 
The inter-organisation communication herein analysed refers to the communication 
undertaken among NZTA decision makers, its consultant (Opus) and the contractor 
(Works). The intra-organisation communication analysed refers to the communication 
established between the aforementioned organisations and the local Police.   
 
The alarm and the communication process started with the Police who were alerted by 
the public. The Police informed NZTA about the event, and NZTA shared the information 
with Works. In the particular case of Mt. Ruapehu eruption, the flow of information 
through NZTA call centre was judged unsatisfactory, with many steps along the 
information chain, increasing the potential for misinterpretations. However, during the 
event management, a direct information sharing process was established between the 
Police and the Contractor. It is worth noting that Opus did not have a direct involvement 
other than informing media and NZTA. Works reported back to the Consultant (Opus) 
just to let them know that the situation was under control and no damage was observed. 
This is a procedure normally adopted in minor events.  
 
Information about closure times and response plans acquired from the Contractor, the 
local Police, the Civil Defence and the Ministry of Conservation did not completely match. 
This was interpreted as a low level of connectivity between the organisation and as clear 
sign of poor information reach.   
 
Table 4.27 summarises the tangible and intangible vulnerabilities that affected the 
success indicators considered in the information domain and Table 4.28 provides the 
expert judgment about their degree of fulfilment.  
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Table 4.27 - Information Domain Vulnerability Matrix after Mount Ruapehu event. 
INFORMATIONDOMAIN 
SI1- Level of Connectivity 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC 
-  - - - Lack of flexibility in the information chain 
SI2 - Information richness 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities 
  - - 
Lack of an organised 
methodof recording and 
sharing information 
- 
SI3 - Information reach 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities 
-  - - 
Mismatching information 
between organisations 
(police and contractor) 
- 
 
 
The success indicators pertinent to the Information Domain, namely SI1 Connectivity, SI2 
Information Richness and SI3 Information Reach were assessed with a degree of 
fulfilment respectively of FI1 =2.33, FI2=3, FSI3=2.67. Assuming the same proportion 
relevance αi=0.33 for all the success indicators in the Information Domain, the 
performance for the Information Domain was evaluated according to Equation 3.2 as 
“fair” DI=2.67.  
 
 
 
Table 4.28 -Information Domain Assessment Matrix after Mount Ruapehu event. 
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SI1) Connectivity  2 3 N/A 2  2.33 
SI2) Information richness  3 3 N/A 3  3 
SI3) Information reach  3 2 N/A 3  2.67 
   INTRA INTER PUBLIC DATA  DI 
Applicable:  Yes , No   SUB-TASKS  2.67 
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Overall analysis 
Considering the domain scores and assuming the same proportion relevance γd =0.25 
for all domains, the performance is computed as DM=2.84 which means that the 
resilience of the decision making process is classified as “fair” (adequate but some areas 
of dysfunction with limited adaptability; not effective in all circumstances; limited in 
solutions delivery; some feedback to involved organisations). 
 
4.6 Flooding along SH1, Kaikoura 
 
The following subsections present the description and the analysis of the decision 
making process during flooding events that resulted in the closure of State Highway 1 
near Kaikoura. 
 
4.6.1 Background and activities 
During late July 2008, a series of storm events affected New Zealand. The South Island 
was badly affected and in particular a Civil Defence Emergency was declared in the 
Marlborough District Council region.  
 
Dozens of people were evacuated from their homes and a camping ground was set up in 
Picton because of flooding. Swollen streams were made worse by a high tide and 
sandbags were used to try and kept rising water from houses. In Nelson, a major water 
pipeline was damaged by falling trees and authorities asked residents to minimise water 
use as a result. About a dozen residents from Sefton, north of Christchurch, had also 
been evacuated because of flooding and moved to a local school hall.  
 
Flooding forced the closure of State Highway 1 between Blenheim and Kaikoura, and 
emergency services warned about flooding dangers in many parts of Canterbury and 
Marlborough, including Christchurch city. In reality few roads in Christchurch and the 
Waimakariri area experienced surface flooding. The situation was worsened by extreme 
winds which were lifting roof tiles and scattering branches and other debris throughout 
neighbourhoods. 
 
The decision process relevant to the management of the State Highway network in the 
South Island was observed at Opus office in Christchurch, over approximately seven 
hours on the 31st of July 2008.  
 
 
4.6.2 QDM Analysis 
This section presents the analysis of the Quality Decision Making processes after the 
Floods in SH1 Kaikoura, focusing on the Consultant’s response. Due to limitations in 
availability of observation staff, the analysis does not include the assessment of the 
Physical Domain, which would require several observers at the event location.  
 
 
Analysis of the Physical Domain after Flooding along SH1 
For this specific event, Contractors managed specific incidents in the field and available 
resources were sufficient to meet demand, however, staff shifts were not implemented.  
There was no consideration for the possible need to reallocate staff due to 
stress/tiredness and private matters.  
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The information and data collected about the Physical Domain were not sufficient for 
filling in the vulnerability and assessment matrices. 
 
Analysis of the Information Domain after Floods in SH1 
Activities regarding information management were uniquely performed by the 
Consultants who had to report to NZTA on a frequent basis. The communication with 
NZTA was performed mainly relying on internet connection. The Consultants were the 
communication link between NZTA and people on the field.  Information was received 
from field personnel (either Consultant or Contractor staff) by phone (mostly using cell 
phones). RTs were seldom used and information was shared only in spoken and/or 
written forms. 
 
Information was collected and processed, including writing on “post-it” stickers and 
“pinning” them on a hard copy map on the wall. Over the course of the event, the map 
was frequently updated and all cleared damage was recorded on the side of the map. 
Miscommunications were seldom observed. The NZTA was in charge of public 
information. The NZTA website (http://www.transit.govt.nz/) was used efficiently to inform 
the public about the event and its impact on roads and traffic. 
 
Despite the few physical vulnerabilities observed (Table 4.29), five members of the 
decision making team efficiently received, processed and shared information.  
 
Table 4.29 - Information Domain Vulnerability Matrix after Floods in SH1.   
INFORMATIONDOMAIN 
SI1- Level of Connectivity 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible 
Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC 
  - - 
Communication 
entirely dependent 
on internet and 
phone (lack of 
alternative methods 
of communication) 
Only one person retains all the exchanged 
info 
SI2- Information richness 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC Tangible 
Vulnerabilities 
Intangible Vulnerabilities 
  - - 
Lack of  
standardised ways 
to receive, log and 
update information 
- 
  - - 
Limited use of IT 
capabilities (only 
RAMM Data Base 
and a video record 
of the network) 
- 
SI3- Information reach 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC Tangible 
Vulnerabilities 
Intangible Vulnerabilities 
- - - - - - 
 
 
Table 4.30 shows the assessment matrix for the Information domain. The success 
indicators pertinent to the Information Domain, namely SI1 Connectivity, SI2 Information 
Richness and SI3 Information Reach were assessed with a degree of fulfilment 
respectively of FI1 =3.67, FI2=2.5, FI3=2.75. Assuming the same proportion relevance 
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αi=0.33 for all the success indicators in the Information Domain, the performance for the 
Information Domain has been evaluated according to Equation 3.2 at a “fair” level 
DI=2.97.  
 
Table 4.30 - Information Domain Assessment Matrix after Floods in SH1. 
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SI1) Connectivity  4 3 4 N/A  3.67 
SI2) Information richness  2 2 4 2  2.5 
SI3) Information reach  4 2 3 2  2.75 
   INTRA INTER PUBLIC DATA  DI 
Applicable:  Yes , No   SUB-TASKS  2.97 
 
 
 
Analysis of the Cognitive Domain after Floods in SH1 
All members of the decision making team had good understanding of their duties. 
Decisions were achieved through understanding and expertise (e.g. time to reopen the 
roads and to clear debris was estimated).  
 
The consultants had their own specific knowledge about the region and its needs and 
how to meet these. An intangible vulnerability was that inexperienced or new staff could 
not be used to help in managing the event, because structured knowledge or procedures 
were not properly available.  
 
Table 4.31 shows the assessment matrix for the Cognitive domain. The success 
indicators pertinent to the Cognitive Domain, namely SC1 Individual Situation Awareness, 
SC2 Level of Training and Experience and SC3 Intangibles of Leadership and Unit 
Cohesion were assessed with a degree of fulfilment respectively of FC1=4, FC2=3, FC3=4. 
Assuming the same proportion relevance αi=0.33 for all the success indicators the 
performance was evaluated according to Equation 3.2 at a “good” level DC=3.67.  
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Table 4.31 - Cognitive Domain Assessment Matrix after Floods in SH1.   
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SC1) individual situation awareness   4 
SC2) level of training and experience   3 
SC3) intangibles of leadership and unit cohesion.   4 
    DC 
Applicable:  Yes , No    3.67 
 
 
Analysis of the Social Domain during Floods in SH1 
Regarding the coordination of actions, the team observed a good level of self-
synchronisation at the field level. Contractors were able to manage specific instances on 
the field and to prioritise the available plant and machinery that was sufficient to cover all 
the resources required by the event.  
 
Table 4.32 shows the assessment matrix for the Social domain. The success indicators 
pertinent to the Social Domain, namely (SS1)Responsiveness to the Needs of Emergency 
Management Agencies, (SS2)Technical Advice to Leading Emergency Management 
Agencies and Lifeline Groups and (SS3)Coordination of Actions with all Involved 
Agencies were assessed with a degree of fulfilment respectively of FS1 =2, FS2=2, FS3=3. 
Assuming the same proportion relevance αi=0.33 for all the success indicators, the 
performance was evaluated according to Equation 3.2 at a “fair” level DI=2.33.  
 
 
Table 4.32 -Social Domain Assessment Matrix after Floods in SH1.   
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 SS1) responsiveness to the needs of emergency management 
agencies   2 
SS2) technical advice to leading emergency management 
agencies and lifeline groups   2 
SS3) coordination of actions with all involved agencies   3 
    DS 
Applicable:  Yes , No    2.33 
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Overall analysis 
Considering the scores of the three analysed domains, the performance of the decision 
making process after Floods in SH1 real event, has resulted in  DM=2.99. This means 
that the decision making process is classified as “fair” (adequate but some areas of 
dysfunction with limited adaptability; not effective in all circumstances; limited in solutions 
delivery; some feedback to involved organisations), but borders on the threshold of being 
classified as “good”. 
 
 
4.7 Flooding along SH2, Matata 
 
The following subsections present the description and the analysis of the decision 
making process during the Flooding along SH2, Matata. 
 
4.7.1 Background and activities 
Matata is a seaside village of approximately 500 people in the Bay of Plenty region, 
North Island of New Zealand. Matata is located halfway between Whakatane, which is a 
forestry industry region, and Tauranga, where one of the busiest ports of New Zealand is 
located. Whakatane and Tauranga are connected by railway and road, with the State 
Highway SH2 being the most important part of the network, with heavy traffic observed 
daily in both directions.  
 
On the evening of May 16th, 2005, the MetService issued a heavy rain warning to the 
local (Whakatane District Council) and regional authorities (Bay of Plenty Regional 
Council). They also notified all infrastructure and lifeline providers in the region, including 
the NZTA offices in Hamilton and Gisborne.  
 
In the early hours of May 17th the NZTA area engineer and the Consultant engineer, who 
were coincidently meeting together in Whakatane, received initial reports from the local 
community and NZTA Contractors about partial road closures on SH 2 due to water on 
the road surface and localized slips blocking traffic.  
 
An additional contracting crew was mobilised to the location of the road closure via 
mobile phone. SH2 was reopened approximately 12 hours after the first warnings were 
received. The poor weather conditions continued overnight however and during road 
inspections the following day (May 18th) the NZTA area engineer and Consultant 
engineer together, actually witnessed the washout of one bridge embankment.  
 
Subsequent reports from road users about more washouts prompted the NZTA area 
engineer and the Consultant engineer to hire a helicopter in Whakatane and conduct a 
fly-over inspection. Immediately after the inspection, complete road closure of SH 2 was 
declared and supplementary personnel and equipment from the NZTA Contractor were 
requested. Up to that point in time, communications and exchange/sharing of data and 
information were very limited. The NZTA Headquarters in Wellington had been informed 
of the road closure, without any estimation of the reopening time. The area engineer 
liaised with local and regional councils sharing the same level of information available to 
NZTA Headquarters. Press releases were made to the media about the road closures. 
Interaction between the NZTA area engineer and the Consultant engineer occurred 
almost instantly as both were in situ coordinating and making decisions together. 
 
The Consultant engineer, originally based in Matata, reported back to his office in 
Whakatane via mobile phone communications and using his deputy road technician. 
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Consultant’s reports were used to produce maps of road closures and initial estimates of 
damage and costs. Transmitted data comprised very general instructions referring to 
road assets per kilometre. No specific data on previous road asset conditions (e.g. 
location and characteristics of roading elements) were readily accessible to the involved 
parties (NZTA, Consultant and Contractors). 
 
On the afternoon of May 18th a Civil Defence Emergency was declared by the Western 
Bay of Plenty Emergency Management Office. Subsequently the Whakatane District 
Council also declared a state of local emergency for the Edgecumbe-Tarawera Ward 
(Matata Township) on the evening of the 18th May. Late that night, a band of intense rain 
passed over the catchments behind Matata and triggered many landslips (debris 
avalanches), which destroyed 27 homes and seriously damaged 87 properties Initial 
response actions commenced immediately.  
 
Resources were already available in the area due to earlier road closures. However, a 
major drawback was a lack of suitable gear for operating during the night because 
batteries for the spotlights available were faulty. Communications relied almost entirely 
on cellular mobile telephones and radio telephones (RT’s). All involved parties (NZTA 
engineer, Consultant and Contractor) were using Telecom cell phones, which had good 
coverage in the area. Conversely, the research team had some difficulties contacting the 
response parties, because our Vodafone cell phones had very poor coverage in some 
areas of the affected region. Radio communication was largely used between the 
contractor’s crew. Localised communications over short distances, such as for the 
direction of machinery and personnel were very well suited to low frequency RT 
communications. Nevertheless, during times of confusion, face-to-face communications 
proved to be the most effective means of getting activities underway.  
 
The landslips in Matata and complete closure of SH2 created difficulties in transporting 
equipment and personnel from Tauranga. Alternative routes through mountainous areas 
had to be used, which incurred delays in the response actions. Nevertheless, the 
contractor mobilised a considerable number of personnel (over 50 people) and 
machinery (25 heavy load trucks, 10 diggers, 4 bulldozers, 1 grader, etc).  
 
On the 20th, SH2 partially reopened overnight (5pm to 5am) for use by heavy and 
commercial traffic only. On 30th May, 14 days after the initial closures, SH2 was 
completely reopened to general traffic. At that point in time, the NZTA had no specific 
assessment of road repair costs, but approximate estimates ranged from 2.5 to 5 million 
dollars. Consultants recorded daily information on damage and resource deployment. 
This mainly consisted of a list of damaged assets, their priorities and recommended 
treatment. This information was shared with the Contractor using paper.  
 
 
4.7.2 QDM Analysis 
This section presents the analysis of the Quality Decision Making processes after 
Flooding along SH2, Matata, focusing on the Contractors’ and Consultants` response. 
Due to the presence of one research team member on the field during several phases of 
the emergency management and response, it was possible for this event, to analyse all 
of the domains of the decision making process.  
 
Analysis of the Physical Domain duringFlooding along SH2, Matata 
The 2005 Matata township flood was a small-medium emergency event in contrast to the 
previous year’s events that caused widespread damage in the Bay of Plenty. The 2005 
event was mostly confined to the Matata township and its nearby coastal area, which 
comprises a portion of SH2 known as the “Matata Straight” (approximately 5 km of road). 
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As the emergency response was concentrated in very specific parts of the roading 
infrastructure, the NZTA area engineer and Consultant coordinated involved 
organisations and their resources locally. 
 
Table 4.33 shows the tangible vulnerabilities that affected the physical domain decision-
making process.  
 
Table 4.33 -Physical Domain Vulnerability Matrix after Flooding along SH2, Matata.   
PHYSICAL DOMAIN 
SP1 - Minimisation of road closures duration and variability 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities DHR DPR TTM DAM 
    
No suitable gear for operating during the 
night because batteries for the spotlights 
available were faulty 
- 
    
Contractors did not know the exact location 
and prior characteristics of roading 
elements  
- 
SP2 - maximisation of accessibility to strategic services and places 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities DHR DPR TTM DAM 
    
The landslips in Matata and complete 
closure of SH2 created difficulties in 
transporting equipment and personnel from 
Tauranga in order to effect repairs  
- 
SP3 -  minimization of response and recovery costs 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities DHR DPR TTM DAM 
    
Alternative routes through mountainous 
areas had to be used, which incurred delays 
in the response actions 
- 
 
Table 4.34 shows the assessment matrix for the Physical domain. The success 
indicators pertinent to the Physical Domain, Minimisation of road closures duration and 
variability, SP1, Maximisation accessibility to strategic services and places, SP2, 
Minimisation response and recovery costs, SP3 were assessed with a degree of fulfilment 
respectively of FP1=3, FP2=2, FP3=3. Assuming the same proportion relevance αi=0.33 for 
all the success indicators in the Physical Domain, the performance for the Physical 
Domain has been evaluated according to Equation 3.2 at a “fair” level DP=2.67.  
 
Table 4.34 - Physical Domain Assessment Matrix after Flooding along SH2, Matata.  
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SP1) Minimisation of road closures duration and variability  3 
SP2) Maximisation accessibility to strategic services and places     2 
SP3) Minimisation response and recovery costs  3 
   DP 
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Applicable:  Yes , No   2.67 
 
Analysis of the Information Domain afterFlooding along SH2, Matata 
Observation of communications and data/information exchange/sharing during the 
Matata events indicates that informal linkages and assessment were the dominant form 
of communications. An important issue observed during the case study was the potential 
fragility in a larger scale event of the communication systems used to manage the 
response. The predominant means of communication for the SHO was either face-to-
face meetings or by cellular/mobile telephones. The fact that both the Contractor and 
Consultant representatives were together at the time the event escalated simplified 
subsequent communications significantly and allowed for shared decision-making. The 
RT network was also used for communications during the response; however it was only 
used for communications within organisations. In a large scale emergency event the 
cellular/mobile phone network is likely to be an unreliable means of communication; cell 
phone towers may be damaged, there may be poor network coverage at the site; or the 
network may become overloaded as the volume of calls made by the general public 
escalates during times of crisis.  
 
Regarding data management, the information system used (RAMM) was perceived as 
not suitable for coping with the dynamic nature of such an event. RAMM is largely 
employed in asset management and maintenance of State Highways, therefore it is 
programmed and organised to support medium term decision-making. During an 
emergency event, RAMM provides limited information value, because damage may have 
altered the whole arrangement and location of roading elements. For example, the 
contractor may want to replace a stop sign using RAMM-kilometre reference, but the 
road alignment has been completely changed due to mud and debris and it becomes 
impossible to identify sign posts and any other references required to perform the 
original task. One other example indicating RAMM’s deficiency in supporting emergency 
decision making is that during the observed deployment of heavy machinery, no data 
was retrieved from RAMM in order to indicate, for example, the original grading and 
alignment. Table 4.35 summarises the aforementioned tangible vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 4.35 -Information Domain Vulnerability Matrix after Floods in SH2 Matata.  
INFORMATIONDOMAIN 
SI1- Level of Connectivity 
Task/Sub-tasks Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible Vulnerabilities INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC 
    Limited cell phone coverage in some areas 
 
SI2- Information richness 
INTRA INTER MEDIA PUBLIC Tangible Vulnerabilities Intangible 
Vulnerabilities 
  - - 
Available information system not 
suitable for coping with the dynamic 
nature of an emergency event 
 
 
Table 4.36 shows the assessment matrix for the Information domain. The success 
indicators pertinent to the Information Domain, namely SI1 Connectivity, SI2 Information 
Richness and SI3 Information Reach were assessed with a degree of fulfilment 
respectively of FI1 =4, FI2=3, FI3=3. Assuming the same proportion relevance αi=0.33 for 
all the success indicators in the Information Domain, the performance for the Information 
Domain has been evaluated according to Equation 3.2 at a “verygood” level DI=3.33.  
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Table 4.36 - Information Domain Assessment Matrix after Floods in SH2 Matata.  
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SI1) Connectivity   4 
SI2) Information richness   3 
SI3) Information reach   3 
   DI 
Applicable:  Yes , No   3.33 
 
 
Analysis of the Cognitive Domain afterFloods in SH2 Matata 
Decision makers` previous knowledge about the area and the assets was largely used 
for the management of the floods in SH2 Matata. Moreover, “common sense” was 
constantly used to compensate for a lack of information. Both of these elements have 
been positively judged when assessing the cognitive domain (Table 4.37). Obviously, 
despite the recognised importance of previous knowledge and common sense, it is worth 
highlighting the need to formalise these characteristics in order to be able to efficiently 
use them to solve more complex problems such as would be the case in a larger scale 
event. 
 
Table 4.37 - Cognitive Domain Assessment Matrix after Floods in SH2 Matata. 
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SC1) individual situation awareness   4 
SC2) level of training and experience   4 
SC3) intangibles of leadership and unit cohesion.   3 
    DC 
Applicable:  Yes , No    3.67 
 
 
Analysis of the Social Domain afterFloods in SH2 Matata 
Overall, the management of the response and recovery observed from the Matata event 
was very effective. The people on the ground knew each other very well, and this helped 
to facilitate shared decision making and communications. In a larger scale event 
however, those managing the response and recovery may not know each other so well, 
particularly where external people are brought into the area to support local teams. In a 
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larger scale event, where more organisations are involved and the situation is more 
complex, there is likely to be a need for more formal structures for planning and co-
ordination. Table 4.38 shows the assessment matrix for the Social domain that was 
performed at a “good” level DS=4. 
 
Table 4.38 - Social Domain Assessment Matrix after Floods in SH2 Matata. 
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 SS1) responsiveness to the needs of emergency management 
agencies   N/A 
SS2) technical advice to leading emergency management agencies 
and lifeline groups   N/A 
SS3) coordination of actions with all involved agencies   4 
    DS 
Applicable:  Yes , No    4 
 
Overall analysis 
Considering the domain scores and assuming the same proportion relevance γd =0.25 
for all domains, the performance is computed as DM=3.42 which means that the 
resilience of the decision making process is classified as “good” (mostly coordinated; 
mostly adaptable; effective in most circumstances; comprehensive in solutions delivery; 
comprehensive feedback to involved organisations). 
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5 Comparative Analysis 
 
This section presents a comparative examination of the quality of decision-making 
results. The aim is to highlight the strengths and weaknesses currently affecting the 
decision making approaches adopted by SHOs during crisis events. The next three sub-
sections summarise the observed vulnerabilities and the overall QDM analysis.  
 
5.1 Key Vulnerabilities affecting extreme event decision making 
 
Due to the different nature of exercises and events, the vulnerabilities are presented 
separately.  
 
Vulnerabilities recorded during Simulation Exercises  
Even though no significant vulnerabilities were observed in the Social Domain, several 
issues were quite common amongst the Physical, Information and Cognitive domains. 
Annex D shows tables summarising all of the vulnerabilities for each observation domain. 
The most common were: 
• Physical Domain: insufficient and/or difficulties in deploying human and physical 
resources; 
• Information Domain: lack of alternative means of communications, lack of 
dedicated personnel to collect process, information sharing and an inability of  
decision makers to access intra-organisation information; and 
• Cognitive Domain: lack of individual situation awareness combined with 
deficiencies in decision makers’ training and experience.  
 
Vulnerabilities recorded during Real Events  
During the observation of real events our team members were not located in the main 
Emergency Operations Centre and so were unable to record social and cognitive 
vulnerabilities. However we managed to identify the following issues in other domains: 
• Physical Domain: the response activities were delayed because of the lack of 
redundancy in the network or more importantly because of the lack of awareness 
or unwillingness to use alternative routes, which would facilitate temporary traffic 
management; and 
• Information Domain: inadequate information systems, lack of alternatives 
methods of communication, lack of dedicated personnel to collect, process and 
share information, and the impossibility for all the decision makers to have access 
to intra-organisation information.  
 
Comparatively, similar vulnerabilities were identified in both exercises and events. This 
may indicate that decision makers tend to act quite similarly in both contexts. One 
exception is that in events vulnerabilities are observed in specific problems. For example, 
temporary traffic management is usually a common problem affecting the physical 
domain.  
 
In real events, involved SHOs are under pressure to achieve immediate and localised 
solutions and, they tend to make decisions without considering the network implications. 
On the other hand, during exercises participants have the opportunity to conceptualise 
and rationalise various action scenarios, but are unable to test in situ allocation of 
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resources. Similar observations could be drawn in terms of information sharing needs 
and procedures during exercises and events.  
 
5.2 Comparative Analysis of Decision Making Quality Scores 
The overall performance of SHOs is within the Good and Limited Resilience ranges. As 
graphically represented in Figure 5.1 and summarised in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, each event 
and simulation exercise presented different characteristics in terms of decision making 
performance. This was mostly due to the consistently high performance observed in the 
Cognitive and Social Domains, with a lower level (but still satisfactory) in the Physical 
and Information domains. SHOs were generally capable of providing a “fair” level of 
responsiveness and technical advice, as well as showing good individual awareness.  
 
 
 
Marconi Exercise
Icarus Exercise
Capital Quake Exercise 2006
Ruaumoko Exercise 2008  
Mount Ruapehu Volcanic Eruption
Floods in SH1 Kaikoura
Floods in SH2 Matata  
 
Figure 5.1 – Decision making performance level for observed exercises and events. 
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Table 5.1 -Decision Domain Scores and Decision Making global scores for simulation 
exercises.   
   Domain   
 Physical Information Cognitive Social Overall 
Exercises DP DI DC DS DM 
Marconi Exercise  2.33   2.33 
Icarus Exercise  2.33 3.33 2 2.55 
Capital Quake 2006 2 2.86 2.67 2.5 2.51 
Ruaumoko Exercise 2008  - 2.44 2.33 2.67 2.48 
Average score 2 2.49 2.78 2.39 2.47 
 
Table 5.2 -Decision Domain Scores and Decision Making global scores for real events.   
   Domain   
 Physical Information Cognitive Social Overall 
Real Events DP DI DC DS DM 
Mount Ruapehu Volcanic Eruption 3 2.67 - - 2.84 
Floods in SH1 Kaikoura - 2.97 3.67 2.33 3 
Floods in SH2 Matata 2.67 3.33 3.67 4 3.42 
Average score 2.84 2.99 3.67 3.17 3.08 
 
SHOs performed slightly better in real events than in simulation exercises. The average 
scores show that the performance in real events reached a “Good Resilience” level, 
whereas simulation exercises were mostly at the “Fair Resilience” level. As shown in 
Figure 5.2, SHOs performed better in real events for all observation domains. The team 
observed a good individual awareness and high levels of training and experience. 
However there was limited leadership and cohesion, when managing real events.   
 
On one hand, these results demonstrate that SHOs have strong technical and leadership 
capabilities, which are clearly and efficiently used in real events. On the other hand, 
these results could be perceived as showing an indication of lack of experience and 
leadership when non-senior staff are subject to pressure and complex situations. A 
plausible reason for the different performances may be signs of only partial commitment 
shown by some exercise participants. SHO personnel involved in real crises performed 
very well under pressure. 
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Figure 5.2 - Average values of the Decision Domain Scores resulting for simulation 
exercises and real events.  
 
The best performance occurred in the Matata Flooding event. A combination of highly 
experienced staff, good timing/coordination and efficient usage of information were 
computed and analysed as high scores in the Cognitive, Social and Information domains. 
Even though the event created substantial pressure on all involved parties, SHOs 
managed to overcome difficulties and re-established partial network accessibility within a 
reasonable timeframe. This is appropriately reflected in the highest achieved scores as 
shown in Table 5.2.  
 
Despite the performance in most exercises and events, the deficiencies associated with 
the Physical and the Information Domains are significant. In the Physical Domain, the 
scores shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 clearly show that improving resource allocation and 
optimisation needs to be addressed. Similarly, the Information Domain scores show that 
there is still limited coverage in information sharing process and that no information-
sharing standards have been adopted so far. Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that 
SHOs have excelled in terms of both formal and informal connections.  
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6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
This report introduced a novel approach to analysing the quality of SHO decision making. 
Based upon the combination of state-of-the-art knowledge about decision making theory, 
the QDM method was conceptualised and applied to several case studies of events and 
simulation exercises observed in New Zealand over the last 6 years. Above all, this 
report presents a diagnosis about how SHOs perform decision making activities.  
 
The results of the QDM analysis indicate that SHOs are capable, experienced and 
competent in dealing with major disruptions or crises that may affect the State Highway 
Network of New Zealand. SHOs have achieved Good and Fair levels of resilience in 
decision making activities during emergency response events and exercises. Depending 
on the event or exercise, this means that SHOs can:  
- Be mostly or partially coordinated; 
- Be mostly or limited adaptable; 
- Be effective or partially effective in most circumstances; 
- Provide comprehensive or limited in solutions delivery; and  
- Provide comprehensive or limited feedback to involved orgs. 
 
Our analysis revealed that SHOs performed slightly better in real events than in 
simulation exercises. This difference in performance is mostly because exercises are 
used to expose junior staff to situations which they do not fully understand and/or have 
the experience to deploy and coordinate resources allocation.  
 
SHO’s major strengths were their ability to perceive, assess and act based upon 
experience and technical skills. This often took the form of extensive networking 
(informal and professional) with key individuals involved in emergency response. Senior 
SHO staff demonstrated high levels of situation awareness and leadership in various 
situations.  
 
SHO’s major decision making weaknesses during the emergency response are mostly 
related to resource allocation and information sharing. Most decisions were performed 
without clear and/or rationalised/structured processes supporting them. This was 
significantly affected by the fact that SHOs did not have decision making tools. Due to 
the level of complexity and the risky nature of events, decision making can be 
overwhelming; some decision makers could not grasp all of the potential response 
actions, implications and benefits/costs throughout all the emergency response stages. 
Also the lack of reliable and well presented information did not help those involved in the 
decision making process.  
 
Based upon our experience throughout this project and with parallel work conducted 
over the last 5 years on improving the performance of SHOs, a list of recommendations 
is introduced. They include: 
 
A. An extensive program to address the observed vulnerabilities: personnel 
involved in real events should be invited to discuss the observed vulnerabilities 
and assess whether they have already been addressed or whether further action 
is required. This would follow preparation and readiness actions towards 
extensive implementation of the measures; 
 
B. The establishment of a continuous program of event and exercise 
observation using the proposed QDM method: this would comprise a set of 
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designated observers who would participate in all upcoming events and exercises 
in order to further expand this report’s findings. Over time, it is envisaged that a 
significant body of knowledge would be created and transferred to all SHOs 
around the country; 
 
C. Decision making vulnerability matrix for use in exercise and event debriefs: 
this comprises the creation of a simple tool (vulnerability matrix) to record the 
strengths and weaknesses observed in decision making during emergency 
exercises and events. During major NZTA exercise debriefs, the decision making 
vulnerability matrix would diagnose how effective decision makers were against 
critical criteria, such as information sharing, physical resource deployment, and 
cognitive and social awareness. This would allow all NZTA involved parties to 
quickly and simply visualise aspects of decision making that require improvement. 
The vulnerability matrix would be also useful to set formal standards and 
benchmarks, which will be consistently compared against subsequent 
experiences and improvements to decision making practices.  
 
D. Training package for the decision making board game simulation: Ferreira’s 
work (2009) showed that the NZTA can quickly and cost-effectively diagnose how 
individuals and teams behave under crisis circumstances. Through a decision 
making board game, SHOs would be able to reveal whether or not staff rely on 
ad-hoc knowledge to make decisions, and how structured their decision making 
process is in terms of following pre-defined emergency procedures. The board 
game package would also be useful to encourage the development and 
mentoring of leadership, because it will allow junior and senior staff to interact 
and learn through their experiences. Finally, the board game package would be 
helpful in establishing a well-structured basis for results discussion.  
 
E. Standardising symbols for maps generated during emergencies: a set of 
common symbols and formatting would be created to best suit SHO’s response 
and recovery activities. A training package comprising powerpoint slides and an 
implementation guide should be prepared for the NZTA;  
 
F. Implementation of a GIS-based information sharing framework for 
emergency response and recovery: the lack of proper information technology 
was one of the problems affecting the achievement of a good level of individual 
situation awareness and of a good level of training and knowledge. The 
introduction of GIS-based tools to support the decision making process could 
considerably increase the individual situation awareness of decision makers. 
Based on our previous work, we have demonstrated that a proposed SHO 
information sharing framework would potentially generate NZ$300,000 in travel 
time savings alone for a South Island desktop case study; and 
 
G. Use GIS to support simulation exercises:during the Exercise “Icarus Flies 
Again”, our research team participated in the activities by producing damage 
maps as injects were introduced to participants. Based on quick surveys 
conducted before and after the exercise, it was verified that participants generally 
demonstrated awareness of the efficiency of GIS technology and confirmed that 
maps created during an exercise facilitatedecision making and the information 
sharing processes during an emergency response. GIS technology has 
demonstrated a number of potential benefits of implementation, e.g. real time 
mapping which is able to support the decision making process. We envisage that 
GIS could be an integral part of exercises, because it would contribute a more 
realistic platform to run exercises.  
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ANNEX A – ICARUS EXERCISE SCENE SETTER AND 
TIMETABLE/INJECTS 
 
A-1 – Scenario Scene Setter.  
Source: Exercise Icarus Planning Document, 2007 (Version 3) . 
 
This scenario is based on that used for the Capital Quake exercise in November 06, 
with some modifications. 
 
At 4pm on the 21st of November, a major shallow earthquake measuring 7.6 on the 
Richter scale occurs with the epicentre located at Petone.  The earthquake creates a 
75 kilometre surface rupture along the Wellington Fault from Cook Strait to Kaitoke 
north of Upper Hutt.  Along the fault the ground is displaced horizontally by up to 5 
metres and vertically by up to 1 metre.  Severe ground shaking occurs for at least 45 
seconds in the Wellington/Hutt Valley basin, and sedimentary areas over a 100-
kilometre radius amplifies ground shaking for varying periods. 
 
The earthquake results in Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) shaking of 10 in the vicinity 
of Petone and the Wellington CBD, and MMI shaking of 9 in much of the rest of the 
Wellington city area (see below diagrams and definitions).    Regions from Nelson to 
the Wairarapa also receive significant shaking, but damage levels are less severe than 
those in the Wellington region.   
 
Major damage is caused to infrastructure of Wellington, Hutt Valley, Porirua and Kapiti 
areas. Several buildings collapsed and many tonnes of debris and glass are covering 
inner CBD streets. The violent horizontal and vertical motions that lasted for about one 
minute also caused widespread liquefaction and slumping in Wellington City, Hutt and 
Porirua. 
 
Consequences from the impact include: 
• Collapsed buildings – trapped people 
• Many people injured/dead 
• Road access blocked – cities/districts isolated 
• Lifeline services severely damaged/destroyed 
• Fires following the earthquake 
• Scarce resources -  human, equipment, material 
 
Severe damage occurred around the harbour perimeter due to liquefaction, and the 
Wellington CBD and the wharves in the harbour were severely damaged.  In this 
scenario, the earthquake only caused minor seiching in the harbour and early tsunami 
warnings were lifted about three hours after the initial earthquake event.   
 
Although the impacts from a Wellington fault event will cause significant damage to the 
physical and built environment, it is important to realise that many structures will 
sustain only minor or moderate damage.  For example, loss modelling indicates that 
approximately 11% of houses across the Wellington region would be severely 
damaged or would collapse. 
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Aftershocks of varying magnitudes from M6.5 to smaller M5.5 are expected to continue 
for many days, weeks, and even months.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MM10 
• Most heavy structures extensively damaged; some well-built timber 
structures destroyed 
• Landsliding very widespread in susceptible terrain, including failures of 
roads and rail cuttings; liquefaction effects widespread and severe 
MM9 • Considerable damage in specially designed structures; extensive with 
partial collapse in ordinary buildings. Underground pipes broken 
• Landsliding general on steep slopes; liquefaction effects widespread with 
large lateral spreading adjacent to rivers and ports 
Figure A1.1 Modified Mercalli Intensities:  Scale of Damage in Wellington Region 
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MM8 • Slight damage in specially designed structures; considerable in ordinary 
buildings and great in poorly built structures 
• Small to moderate landslides (103 to 105 m3) widespread; a few large 
landslides (105 to 106 m3). Evidence of soil liquefaction (sand boils, lateral 
spreading and settlement) 
MM7 • Negligible damage in buildings of good design and construction; 
considerable in poorly built structures 
• A few small to moderate landslides (103  to 105 m3) 
MM6 • Felt by all; damage slight 
• A few small soil and rock falls 
MM5 • Felt by nearly everyone; unstable objects overturned 
MM4 • Felt indoors by many; outdoors by few 
 
Figure A1.2 Modified Mercalli Intensities:  Scale of Damage in Wellington Region 
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Table A1.1. Exercise Timetable and Injects.  
TIME INJECT 
8am All players get a phone call from a control team member advising them: to review their 
personal preparedness at home; consider how long it might take to get to the EOC in a real 
event; fill a backpack with what they might take to the EOC in a real event and to report to 
the nominated EOC location by 9am 
9am - 
NZTA 
Mock handover briefing, where players are briefed on the scenario, – including the 
exercise simplification of focusing all efforts on reopening SH1.  They will also have the 
suggested EOC layout and information management systems explained to them. This 
briefing is expected to take 20mins.   
9am - FH Activate and set up EOC.  Initial briefing to players on the scenario – including the 
exercise simplification of focusing all efforts on reopening SH1. 
9am - 
GWRC 
Activate EOC.  Initial briefing to players on the scenario – including the exercise 
simplification of focusing all efforts on reopening SH1. 
9:10am 
GWRC 
Inject: deliver both DVD and marked up aerial photographs to Lifelines Coordinator. 
9:10am - 
FH 
Instruction Inject: FH staff are instructed that they need to use actual plant availability 
information for reopening SH1 - what was on-site at 4pm yesterday.  Note: in the exercise 
context no field crews will be working at this time, so they can only use personal 
knowledge and any information kept on paper within the office. 
9:20am 
NZTA 
Inject: players will be told that overnight Richard and Erica sent a runner to GWRC to 
collect aerial reconnaissance information.  Expected time of return unknown. 
9:20am 
and 
ongoing - 
FH 
Injects: Fulton Hogan start to receive piecemeal information from staff as they arrive at 
the depot on what they have seen on their way from home, and from field crews over the 
RT.  Further injects of this nature will be fed to the FH EOC throughout the morning.  
9:25am Major aftershock felt 
9:27am - 
FH 
Call over RT from FH field crew: “That aftershock just caused a major landslip on Hutt 
Road just North of Caltex fuel station (just south of Ngauranga Gorge), causing Hutt Road 
Northbound lane to be blocked. Remaining ground at top of slip appears unstable.” 
11:15am 
- FH 
Inject over RT from FH field crew:We are at [insert name of site of current priority focus] 
and there look to be a number of fatalities under this debris.  Some are still in their 
vehicles, but other bodies are pretty mangled under the debris.  We need to move them if 
we are going to open the road –we have looked at all the other options, but moving these 
bodies is really the only option.  It isn’t going to be a pretty job –some of the bodies are 
pretty messed up.  I haven’t seen any Police or anyone in a uniform around here in hours. 
Are we OK to go ahead and move these bodies –and what should we do with them if we 
are?   
11:15am 
- NZTA 
Communications Staff arrive at the NZTA EOC: on arrival they are advised that both 
National Radio and TV1 are rumoured to be in the area and are likely to turn up at the 
NZTA EOC at any time 
11:15 am 
- FH 
Call from Field Staff over RT:  “hey I’m up at Ngauranga Gorge and just wanted to let 
you know that there is traffic heading North on the South bound lane of the motorway – 
there haven’t been any accidents that I can see yet as people are moving pretty slowly –but 
it is starting to get quite congested.   Just wondering if we should be worrying about traffic 
management or not?”  
11:30am 
- FH 
Inject over RT from FH field crew: “We are at [insert name of a likely area].  We are 
working to get this road cleared, but we have a problem.  There is a high pressure pipeline 
that has been exposed by the slip.  We think it is a gas line.  If it is still pressurised, I’m 
worried about sending our excavators too close to it without some advice on how safe it is.  
If it ruptures it could go like an unsecured fire hose.   At the moment we are trying to work 
around it, but sometime within the next hour we will get to a point where we won’t be able 
to do much more without working right in its vicinity.  Before then, can we get hold of the 
gas company to get some advice on if it is still pressurised?”   
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Table A1.1. Exercise Timetable and Injects. (Continued) 
11:45AM  TV1 NEWS AND NATIONAL RADIO REPORTERS ARRIVE AT HELSTON ROAD 
(ACTED BY GLEN AND RICHARD): THEY ARE PRETTY BULSHY AND 
WANTING INFORMATION! 
12:30pm Exercise ends - Lunch (all sites need to arrange catering)  
12:50pm Hot debrief (20 – 30mins) 
As needed 
–NZTA 
Instruction that a crane is needed at [insert name of site] – NZTA logistics team are to 
call real suppliers to find out what cranes actually would be in the vicinity if the 
earthquake happened today 
  
As needed 
– if bridge 
inspections 
are not 
being 
planned. 
Phone call from Police: “Hello, it is Deputy Inspector [insert name] here.  Our officers 
have closed [insert name of bridge not thought to be badly damaged] bridge as we are 
not sure of its safety – there are some major cracks in the bridge structure and a 
member of the public is said to have heard it groaning.  We are requesting that NZTA 
send a bridge engineer urgently to verify its safety”.  
As needed 
–NZTA 
Facilitators to prompt the discussion about how OPUS engineers will be able to actually 
get to the bridge sites.   
As needed 
– once 
OPUS 
engineer 
sent to 
inspect 
bridges 
Bridge damage information to be supplied in the format of marked up bridge 
photos/plans. 
Source: Exercise Icarus Planning Document (2007). 
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A-2 – Observation of activities at Fulton Hogan EOC 
 
Table A2.1 Fulton Hogan EOC Observation.  
Inject 
Time Inject Description Observation Notes 
8.00 am 
Phone call to participants expecting them 
to define its personal plans, estimate 
travel time from home to the EOC and 
identify gear needs to fill a backpack. 
Fulton Hogan staff did not participate in this 
first hour. Staff were assumed to be at the 
EOC by the time of the emergency response 
actions started. 
9.00 am 
1. EOC set up and active 
2. Scenario Briefing / Focus on reopen 
SH1 
After staff had access to the EOC room they 
start its arrangements as described in the last 
paragraph in the previous sub-section (Pre 
Exercise). Also, the emergency box was 
brought to the room, maps/forms made 
available on the meeting tables and the 
desktop computer started.   
9.10 am 
Damage information as 4.00 pm on the 
day before (Information only available by 
personal knowledge and on paper) 
The following actions were observed in this 
phase: 
1 – The EOC was still being set up (e.g. flip 
chart, movable white board, maps, depot 
role’s sign etc); 
2 – Emergency Box’s items were 
conveniently arranged on the floor; 
3 – Quick meeting in order to organise 
possible information acquired from the field 
on the way to the EOC (Note: just a training 
simulation of what could happen in a real 
situation); 
4 – A white board containing information 
about available gear and staff has been 
brought to the EOC room (Figure A2.1); and 
5 – First damage information collocated on 
the white board (Figure A2.2). 
9.20 am – 
ongoing 
1. Information collected way to depot 
2. RT from field crew 
1 – It was decided that NZTA is the 
responsible organisation to define priorities; 
and 
2 – A table with FH’s heavy gear (referred 
as plant by FH’s staff) and its respective 
locations was started to be filled (Figure 
A2.3). 
9.25 am Major aftershock felt 
Andrew simulated the aftershock by turning 
upside down some tables and disturbing the 
work environment in the room. 
9.27 am Information by Field crew 
1 – Continued to collect information about 
available gear and respective locations; and 
2 – A radio message informing a land slide 
at Old Hutt Road was almost lost (Figure 
A2.4). 
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Table A2.1 Fulton Hogan EOC Observation. (Continued) 
Inject 
Time Inject Description Observation Notes 
9.30 am 
Police radio 
informing that SH 
58 is open and ok 
to drive 
9.30 am – Information that SH 58 was open is collocated on the board;  
9.35 am – More information about gear/location is available on the board;  
9.37 am – Realised that information about drivers is also necessary. So a 
new table was started to be filled with information about drivers (Figure 
A2.5); 
9.45 am – Field information is registered on the board as presented in 
Figure A2.6; 
9.47 am – SH 1 damage information well described and organised on the 
white board (Figure A2.7); 
9.50 am – NZTA formally required information about available resources 
(i.e. gear and personnel). So it was decided to get all possible information 
about personnel (their location and time to arrive at depots) and gear 
(which depot they were located); 
10.09 am – Fuel availability discussed (Figure A2.8); 
10.10 to 10.15 am – Field crew checking gear at Horokiwi and driving 
south of SH 1; and 
10.25 am – Briefing Section I: a quick discussion was conducted. Please 
refer to section 4 for details. 
10.30 
am 
RT field crew 
informing that a 
plant is out of fuel 
blocking the road 
1 – A break was taken from 10.30 to 11.00. This time was used to relax and 
briefly discuss what could be done to improve the response performance; 2 
– This inject was not given at this time; and 
3 – FH Crew coming down from Wanganui. 
11.00 to 
11.15 
am 
Morning Tea – 
Discussion time on 
how to improve 
the exercise 
11.00 am – One team member had to leave the exercise and staff were 
relocated in its roles considering the discussion prior the break; and 
11.00 to 11.15 am – Information on the white board was rearranged in a 
more organised manner: plant (gear), location, destination, personnel and 
available personnel (Figure A2.9). 
11.15 
am 
1. Bodies below 
debris need to be 
removed – What to 
do? 
2. North traffic on 
south bond lane – 
Traffic 
management? 
11.15 am – Required information from NZTA regarding fuel availability 
and possible locations for delivery; 
11.15 am – It was decided to remove bodies after ringing Police and getting 
an authorization to do so; and 
11.15 am – No action was taken regarding traffic management on the 
motorway. 
11.30 
am 
Cleaning debris 
near a pressurized 
pipeline – How to 
proceed? 
11.30 am – First attempt to contact the pipeline company was failed. 
Subsequent actions: make sure that the location was safe before continuing 
the work (i.e. pipeline not operational)  
11.30 
am 
onwards 
A series of injects 
were provided by 
Mr. Smith 
simulating a real 
scenario. 
1 – A few times information from field crew was lost or badly understood; 
2 – Communications with NZTA and other organisations (e.g. Gas 
Company, GWRC) increased considerably; 
3 – FH Team had a more coordination on managing communication, 
information sharing, decision making and resources deployment; and 
4 – A series of response behaviours were observed during this phase. 
Mainly, team had quick response, but it was not done in a 
structured/organised manner. Response manuals and roles’ descriptions 
were not considered by members.   
12.30 
pm 
End of the 
Exercise Summary of damage situation shown in Figure A2.10 
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Figure A2.1 White Board Containing Available Gear and Personnel.   
 
 
Figure A2.2 First Damage Information.   
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Figure A2.3 Available Gear and Location.   
 
Figure A2.4 New Damage Information as 9.27 am.   
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Figure A2.6 New Field Information at 9.45 am.   
 
Figure A2.7 Well Described Information for Damage in SH 1.   
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Figure A2.8 Fuel Availability at 10.09 am.   
 
 
Figure A2.9 Information Rearranged as 11.15 am. 
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Figure A2.10 Summary of damage situation at 12:30 pm 
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ANNEX B – Exercise Icarus Hot Debrief Form 
Source: Exercise Icarus Planning Document, 2007 
 
Name (optional):  
EOC location (organisation): 
 
What did you personally learn from the exercise? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you feel worked well? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you feel could have been handled better, and how might this be improved in the 
future? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What would be on your ‘wish list’ to have available for future response efforts? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Any other comments? 
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ANNEX C – Capital Quake Exercise Timetable and 
Injects 
TIME ACTIVITY 
1pm 13th 
Nov 
Overall exercise briefing for Controllers.  Hannah is going to attend this briefing and share 
information with the other controllers. 
14th November 2006, Tuesday 
5:30am  Earthquake Occurs (no action required for roading orgs) 
7am -
7:30am 
FH Petone: 
Briefing for FH Petone depot field staff about the exercise, potential impacts of the event, and 
reminder of their role in responding to the event 
7:10am Inject into main exercise: Phone call from FH to the Police and NZTA regional office: “A 
number of massive landslides have occurred along Centennial Highway (SH1 Pukerua Bay to 
Paekakariki).  Some workers trapped please send rescue teams” 
10:30am Injects to be provided to both NZTA National office and WCC about plant availability and 
location around the Wellington region.  These injects to be developed from FH Petone field 
staff briefing. 
Mid-
morning 
Contact to be established between WIAL and Fulton Hogan regarding restoration of the airport 
runway.  Arrangements put in place for a meeting involving WIAL, FH and BECA pavement 
engineers at 9:30am on Day 2. 
12pm – 
12:30pm 
FH Rongatai: 
Similar briefing for FH Rongatai depot staff. 
2:30pm Injects to be provided to both NZTA National office and WCC about plant availability and 
location in the central city.  These injects to be developed from FH Petone field staff briefing. 
3pm – 
4:30pm 
All participants: 
Briefing for all staff involved in the exercise from a roading perspective at MWH’s offices.  
This briefing will set the scene for the exercise including showing a video on what a 
Wellington Quake might actually be like to experience and images from Thailand showing the 
damage caused by resulting tsunami.  This will be the context for discussions around personal 
and family preparedness and the challenges of getting to the EOC.  This scene setter will also 
include a briefing about how the exercise will work (the rules of the game) and show an edited 
video of the Einstein exercise. 
INJECT: latest situation report from the Capital Quake Exercise 
4:30pm – 
5pm 
EOC Managers: 
After the larger briefing, each organisation will have their own mini briefing for players in 
terms of what is expected to be achieved during the exercise.   
7pm End of Day 1 controllers briefing: 
There is a general exercise briefing for all controllers to recap on how Day 1 went.  Erica will 
attend this, as well as the student observers, and can let the other controllers know of any 
significant information or changes required. 
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ANNEX C – CAPITAL QUAKE EXERISE TIMETABLE AND INJECTS 
(Continued) 
TIME ACTIVITY 
15th November 2006, Wednesday 
7am INJECT: All staff involved in the exercise will receive a phone call from their respective 
controllers (i.e. Vic will call FH Petone team etc) to advise the locations where their 
respective EOC’s are going to be set up.   
7:30am – 
9:30am 
Each EOC: 
Staff starting to arrive and set up the EOC.  Roles assigned.  Communications established 
between EOC’s and with Civil Defence. 
INJECT: as soon as comms with CDEM established, Reconnaissance Report will be given. 
INJECT: media reports of damage. 
Information starts to flow into the EOC’s in terms of the regional aerial reconnaissance 
reports, staff observations, media reports, and information sharing between EOC’s.  This 
information needs to be collated into a meaningful picture of overall damage.  Planning of 
flying routes for further reconnaissance missions. 
INJECT: Damage Observed forms filled out be FH staff provided to FH EOC’s 
INJECT: RT’s calling in with damage observations 
INJECT: media reports of damage. 
(NOTE: Some of the above injects will be conflicting!) 
INJECT: staff availability and plant location forms filled out by FH staff to be provided to 
FH EOC’s 
INJECT: Media representatives calling for information 
INJECT: Civil Defence and Transport Cluster request report on road status at 10:30am 
9:30am Any EOC’s with FH radios: 
Open channel call to provide a regional status update.  This report will be done over the 
actual open channel, and all field staff are encouraged to listen in. 
9:30am – 
11:30am 
WIAL: 
Meeting between WIAL EOC, Fulton Hogan and BECA pavement engineers to evaluate 
damage to the runway, repair options, resource requirements and expected restoration times. 
10:30am Report required to Civil Defence and Transport Cluster on the current status of the road 
network.   
More detailed reconnaissance missions.  Request CAA to use helicopter for reconnaissance. 
INJECT: requests from CDEM for an updated report on road network status, this time 
including estimated time to reopen roads by 12pm 
11:30am – 
12:30  
Lunch on the run! 
10:30 – 
12pm 
All EOC’s 
Continuing to build up a picture of damage and available resources, to establish road clearing 
priorities and develop a road access plan with estimated times till restoration 
INJECTS: information coming back from reconnaissance missions 
INJECT: requests from local CDEM office for shifting priorities 
INJECT: severe fuel shortages  
INJECT: large aftershocks 
INJECT: Media reports of another contracting team being hurt in an aftershock causing 
further landslides; unclear if it is a FH team or not 
INJECT: Media calling FH Corporate demanding information INJECT: Media arriving at 
NZTA and FH Petone EOC’s demanding information/interviews 
12pm – 
12:30pm 
Report required to Civil Defence and Transport Cluster on status of the road network, 
operational priorities, estimated times for restoring access on each route, and an detailed list 
of looming issues and resource constraints  
12:30 – 
2pm 
Tour: Visits to the NCMC (the national EOC under the beehive) and/or the Wellington 
Region CDEM EOC’s to see them in action.  Tour starting at the NCMC at 1pm. 
2:30pm  MWH: Hot wash debrief on the exercise (plus social drinks?) 
 95 
 
 
 
ANNEX D – Observed Vulnerabilities in Simulation 
Exercises 
 
Table D.1 - Vulnerabilities affecting the Physical Domain during simulation exercises.  
PHYSICAL DOMAIN  
Deployment of physical and human resources   
- Decision-makers not entirely sure on the range of available options;  
- Impossibility to optimise the deployment of physical and human resources due to the 
very limited options;  
- Problems in localising physical resources before and after their deployment;   
- Staff roster not implemented;   
- Lack of shelter, food, water to support the massive evacuation of people;  
- Insufficient fuel and extra vehicles to evacuate people. 
Temporary traffic management  
- No traffic modelling implemented to understand possible traffic scenarios;                      
- Lack of a comprehensive awareness of the traffic situation during the emergency and 
response phases.  
 
 
Table D.2 - Vulnerabilities affecting the Cognitive Domain during simulation exercises.  
COGNITIVE DOMAIN  
Individual Situation Awareness 
- Staff not fully aware of their role and duties; 
- Lack of awareness about the evolving scenario (e.g. consequences, affected areas, 
impact on traffic behaviour);   
- Lack of understanding on the dimension and criticality of the event; 
- Lack of awareness about available personnel and assets.  
Level of Training and Experience 
- No traffic modelling implemented to understand possible traffic scenarios;                      
- Lack of a comprehensive awareness of the traffic situation during the emergency and 
response phases;  
- Absence of  decision making supporting tools for enhancing knowledge management 
- Individual skills seldom used in their fully capability;  
- Lack of training on available knowledge on vulnerability and risk analysis. These 
could support the scenario perception, the understanding of needs and criticalities and 
the future projection of the evolving situation.  
Intangibles of leadership and unit cohesion 
- personnel not associated to suitable roles considering their particular skills 
- passive role during the exercise;  
- reluctance to get involved and be proactive 
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ANNEX D – OBSERVED VULNERABILITIES IN SIMULATION EXERCISES 
(Continued) 
Table D.3- Vulnerabilities affecting the Information Domain during simulation exercises.  
INFORMATION DOMAIN  
Connectivity  
- Lack of  emergency back-up generators;   
- Potential difficulties to have access to the information due to power outage;  
- No ideas about possible alternatives in case of phone and telecommunication 
unavailability; 
 
- Radio connection with consultants not always working; 
- Information about available resources not well shared between contractors office and 
field personnel and between  contractors office and NZTA; 
- Lack of TV and radio in the emergency room. Lack of awareness of the information 
that media were realising to the public  
 
- Communication by e mail inefficient and delayed many times;  
- Contractors not always receiving NZTA email; 
- Excessive size of the email attachments;  
- Lack of a consistent email protocol for emergency response;  
- No shift to phone when e-mail miscommunications was noticed;  
 
- Lack of assigned personnel to collect, share and process data and info;  
- One person only dedicated to answer the call, few missed calls.; 
- Lack of a dedicated terminal for each one of the decision maker for accessing 
information.  
Information Richness 
- Use of non-codified abbreviations and symbols; 
- Too much use of acronyms, some unnecessary and misleading;  
 
- Information summary on the laminated map and board  insufficient and inaccurate to 
allow for a clear representation of the evolving scenario;  
- Absence of agreed templates/rules for collecting data and information;  
- Lack of an organised manner to record and update information;  
- Existing forms for collecting data and information inadequate;  
- Use of a same situation report along all the exercise, difficulties in identifying 
changes in the situation.  
 
- Very poor use of information technology (including GIS system) to collect, analyse 
and share information;  
- Lack of the specific knowledge to manage and process properly the information 
acquired.  
Information Reach 
- Office staff had problems in identifying locations and activities of the field crews;  
- Difficulties in transferring/ explaining actions and information from the NZTA 
National Office CDEM and operations rooms; 
- Lack of information selectivity: impossibility to restrict information access to some of 
the staff in order to force them to perform only tasks associated to their roles;   
- Limited efforts to disseminate the compiled information to other organisations 
- Poor and disorganised information sharing, performed with limited continuity. 
- Confused priority identification;  
- Very strong concerns in releasing information to media 
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ANNEX E – Observed Vulnerabilities in Real Events 
 
Table E.1 - Vulnerabilities affecting the Physical Domain during real events. 
PHYSICAL DOMAIN  
Deployment of physical and human resources   
- Different location of human and physical resources on respect to incident area;  
- Non suitable gear for operating during the night because batteries for the spotlights 
available were faulty  
- Lack of knowledge about the location and prior characteristic of roading element 
Temporary traffic management  
- Lack of redundancy in the network;  
- Difficulties in transporting equipment and personnel in order to effect repairs because 
of the road temporary closures; 
- Alternative routes through mountainous not used causing delays in the response 
actions. 
 
Table E.2 - Vulnerabilities affecting the Information Domain during real events. 
INFORMATION DOMAIN  
Connectivity  
- Communication entirely dependent on internet and phone  
- Lack of alternative ways of communication 
- Very poor coverage of Vodafone cell phone in some area 
- Lack of flexibility in the information chain.  
- Only one person retains all the exchanged info 
Information Richness 
- Lack of an organised manner to record and share info 
- Lack of a standardised ways to receive, log and update information  
- Limited used of Information technologies capabilities  (only RAMM Data Base and a 
video record of the network)  
- The information system used (RAMM) was perceived as not suitable for coping with 
the dynamic nature of crisis event. 
Information Reach 
- No matching info between organisations (police and contractor) 
 
 
